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1. States parties reaffirm that persons with disabilities have the right to 
recognition everywhere as persons before the law. 
2. States parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity 
on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life. 
3. States parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons 
with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity. 
4. States parties shall ensure that all measures that relate to the exercise of legal 
capacity provide for appropriate and effective safeguards to prevent abuse in 
accordance with international human rights law. Such safeguards shall ensure 
that measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity respect the rights, will 
and preferences of the person, are free of conflict of interest and undue 
influence, are proportional and tailored to the person's circumstances, apply for 
the shortest time possible and are subject to regular review by a competent, 
independent and impartial authority or judicial body. The safeguards shall be 
proportional to the degree to which such measures affect the person's rights and 
interests. 
5. Subject to the provisions of this article, States parties shall take all appropriate 
and effective measures to ensure the equal right of persons with disabilities to 
own or inherit property, to control their own financial affairs and to have equal 
access to bank loans, mortgages and other forms of financial credit, and shall 
ensure that persons with disabilities are not arbitrarily deprived of their 
property. 
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The right to equal recognition before the law is concerned with legal personality – the ability to bear 
rights and duties under law, and legal capacity – whether and how one can exercise, claim or defend 
those rights, and the assumption of legal liability. 
Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)3 is concerned with 
how legal systems themselves enable and disable people as legal actors. In the view of the UN 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘CRPD Committee’) and many of those involved 
in negotiating article 12, it introduces a new paradigm of ‘universal legal capacity’, that cannot be 
limited on grounds of disability or mental incapacity.4 The CRPD Committee maintains that this 
requires the abolition of all forms of substitute decision making. This interpretation of article 12 is 
contested in the literature, but for many involved in the disability movement, ending guardianship 
and other forms of substitute decision making is central to wider advocacy goals of ending 
institutionalisation, forced treatment, and loss of fundamental citizenship rights such as the ability to 
vote, marry and own property.  
The adoption of article 12 has prompted an explosion of literature on the nature of legal personhood, 
legal capacity and the possibilities (or otherwise) of eradicating substituted decision-making and 
introducing new frameworks for support for adults with intellectual disabilities, cognitive 
impairments, psychosocial disabilities and other mental disabilities.5 From its inception to the present 
day it has provoked debate and a degree of controversy. Article 12 has prompted considerable interest 
in alternatives to guardianship and other substituted decision making frameworks, but to date no state 
has entirely abolished substitute decision making. 
The right to equal recognition before the law has profound implications for a wide range of legal 
frameworks for states parties to the Convention, including guardianship laws, the insanity defence, 
civil and criminal trial procedures, electoral law and mental health laws. It touches upon many other 
articles in the Convention, including those concerning detention (article 14), forced treatment (articles 
15, 17 and 25), relationships and reproductive rights (article 23), protection against violence, 
exploitation and abuse (Article 16), the right to life (article 10), access to justice (article 13), living 
independently (article 19), and participation in political and public life (article 29).  
Many hard questions remain: what values and beliefs inform our views about equality and 
discrimination in the context of legal capacity? How should the ‘hard cases’ of risk, undue influence 
and unclear will and preferences be addressed? How should we address the ongoing uncertainty and 
discursive struggles over key concepts such as ‘substituted decision-making’, ‘supported decision-
making’, respect for the ‘will and preferences’ of the person and ‘legal capacity’ itself? And how can 
individual States parties move forward when so many key issues remain open? 
                                                          
3 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 13 December 2006, entered into force 3 May 
2008) 2515 UNTS 3 (CRPD). 
4 CRPD Committee, ‘General comment No 1 (2014) Article 12: Equal recognition before the law’ UN Doc 
CRPD/C/GC/1 (19 May 2014); Amita Dhanda, ‘Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of 
the Past or Lodestar for the Future’ (2006-7) 34 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 429; Amita 
Dhanda, ‘Universal Legal Capacity as a Universal Human Right’, in Michael Dudley, Derek Silove and Fran Gale 
(eds) Mental Health and Human Rights: Vision, praxis, and courage (OUP 2012); Eilionóir Flynn and Anna Arstein-
Kerslake, ‘Legislating Personhood: Realising the Right to Support in Exercising Legal Capacity’ (2014) 10 
International Journal of Law in Context 81-104. 
5 ‘Mental disabilities’ is the term most frequently used in the literature to refer collectively to persons with 
intellectual disabilities, psychosocial disabilities, and acquired cognitive impairments such as brain injuries or 
dementia. However, this terminology is not without controversy, see Helen Spandler, Jill Anderson and Bob 
Sapey, Madness, Distress and the Politics of Disablement (Policy Press 2015). 
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Throughout the history of article 12, and its associated literature, the theme of ambiguity recurs. 
Ambiguity was a necessary cost of unity for the advocacy strategy of disability organisations 
participating in the negotiations of the Convention, it was the price of agreement amongst states 
parties when finalising article 12, and it was ambiguity about whether article 12 permitted or 
prohibited substitute decision making that enabled states parties who could not envisage abolishing 
systems of guardianship or deprivation of legal capacity to sign up to the Convention. Yet the 
possibility that article 12 does prohibit substitute decision making and guardianship has created a 
powerful platform for difficult conversations about the nature and effects of restrictions on legal 
capacity experienced by disabled people worldwide, challenging the status quo and forcing advocates 
of guardianship and substitute decision making systems to re-examine assumptions that have been 
taken for granted. 
As States parties engage with article 12, they should not regard it as a technical problem to be solved 
by legal or other experts. It is fundamental to the spirit of the CRPD that disabled people and 
representative organisations are involved at all stages of its interpretation and implementation.6 At 
each point, the wider politics of representation must be thoughtfully engaged with. There are signs 
that the views expressed by prominent advocates of universal legal capacity are not shared by all in 
wider communities of users and survivors of psychiatry and disabled people.7  This does not mean 
these dissenting voices support the values or practices of the ‘old paradigm’, however.  Plumb writes 
that ‘the issue for me is not intervention as such; it is the nature of that intervention and its 
consequences’.8 
To disregard this diversity of views amongst those directly affected by substitute decision making 
regimes, or to dismiss dissenting voices as instances of ‘false consciousness’, is to replicate at the 
political level the same patterns of discreditation, stigmatisation and silencing that the CRPD itself 
aims to combat. Yet, equally there is a danger that without the ‘strategic unity’ adopted by the 
disability organisations during the negotiations of article 12, there is the possibility of cherry picking 
voices that those responsible for implementing the CRPD find the most palatable. The CRPD has 
created the space for these important conversations, it is up to all of those involved in advocacy, 
commentary, and implementation to act in good faith and with fair representation for all voices of 
those directly affected by article 12. 
 
                                                          
6 Art 4(3) CRPD. 
7 Nev Jones and Mona Shattell, ‘Beyond Easy Answers: Facing the Entanglements of Violence and Psychosis’ 
(2014) 35 Issues in Mental Health Nursing 809-811; Anne Plumb, ‘The Global Politics of Disablement: Assuming 
Impairment and Erasing Complexity’ in Spandler, Anderson and Sapey (n 5Error! Bookmark not defined.), citing 
Christina Katsakou and others, 'Psychiatric patients’ views on why their involuntary hospitalisation was right or 
wrong: a qualitative study' (2012) 47(7) Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology 1169-1179.  Some 
disability rights organisation and users and survivors of psychiatry have argued for the use of functional tests in 
the mental health context: Elyn Saks, Refusing Care: Forced Treatment and the Rights of the Mentally Ill 
(University of Chicago Press 2002); George Szmukler and Diana Rose, ‘Strengthening Self-Determination of 
Persons with Mental Illness’ in J Clausen and N Levy (eds), Handbook of Neuroethics (Springer Netherlands 2015); 
'Deprivation of Liberty safeguards' (Disability Rights UK 2014) 
<http://www.disabilityrightsuk.org/news/2014/october/deprivation-liberty-safeguards> 1 March 2017; Mental 
Health Alliance, A Mental Health Act fit for tomorrow: An agenda for reform (2017) 
<http://www.mentalhealthalliance.org.uk/news/2017-a-mental-health-act-fit-for-tomorrow.html>;D Bhugra 
and others, ‘The WPA Lancet Psychiatry Commission on the Future of Psychiatry’, (2017) 4 Lancet Psychiatry 10, 
775 (see comments of Diana Rose, p 794. 
8 Plumb, in Spandler, Anderson and Sapey (n 5Error! Bookmark not defined.). 
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Background and Travaux Préparatoires 
Although earlier human rights instruments guaranteed equal recognition before the law and the right 
to recognition as a person before the law, the use of guardianship continued to be widespread for 
disabled people9. Several non-binding instruments permitted restrictions on legal capacity on 
disability related grounds and regulated the appointment of third parties (known variously as 
guardians, curators, deputies, etc.) to make substitute decisions for the person. The approach found 
in these instruments is sometimes called the ‘old paradigm’.10 They typically emphasise the 
importance of a ‘presumption of capacity’, the proportionality of restrictions, and procedural 
safeguards such as expert evidence, periodic reviews and rights of appeal. 
This approach can be found in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded 
Persons (1971)11, affirmed by the subsequent UN Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons 
(1975)12. These construct guardianship as a right for ‘the mentally retarded person’ to protect his well-
being and interests. In 1991 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on ‘The protection of 
persons with mental illness and the improvement of mental health care’,13 commonly called the ‘MI 
Principles’. This states that deprivation of legal capacity should only occur after a ‘fair hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal’ and sets out the relevant due process guarantees. Similar 
approaches can be found in regional human rights instruments and courts.14 
Critics of the old paradigm describe this as ‘an ever more perfect and safeguarded process of loss’15 
and claim that all persons, no matter what their impairment, can be supported to exercise legal 
capacity on an equal basis with others. This 'revolutionary'16 view was the subject of often heated 
discussions during the negotiations of article 12, which are recorded in the travaux préparatoires17 
and in the accounts of participants.18 
                                                          
9 I recognise that this terminological choice - ‘disabled people’ - is not without controversy, particularly for those 
identifying as users and survivors of psychiatry, or preferring person first language (Spandler, Anderson and Bob, 
n 5Error! Bookmark not defined.). The terminology I have adopted here reflects the theory and terminology of 
the disabled people’s movement in the UK, where this author is based. I have adopted this in preference to 
‘users and survivors of psychiatry’ because the implications of Art 12 are wider reaching than this group, because 
this article concerns a disability treaty, and because there is no agreed upon terminology that reflects the 
preferences of all demographics affected by Art 12. I hope readers will understand that this chapter does not 
seek to impose an identity upon them which they do not claim as theirs. 
10 Kristin Booth Glen, ‘Changing Paradigms: Mental Capacity, Legal Capacity, Guardianship and Beyond’ (2012) 
44 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 93. 
11 UNGA Res 2856 (XXVI) (20 December 1971). 
12 UNGA Res 3447 (XXX) (9 December 1975). 
13 UNGA Res 46/119 (17 December 1991). 
14 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, ‘Recommendation (99) 4 on principles concerning the legal 
protection of incapable adults’ (23 February 1999). Recommendation 99 has strongly influenced the approach 
of the European Court of Human Rights in its case law on legal capacity and guardianship. 
15 Gerard Quinn ‘Liberation, Cloaking Devices and the Law: A Personal Reflection on the Law and Theology of 
Article 12 of the UN CRPD' (Rights & Enforcement – The Next Steps. BCNL Conference, Sofia, 16 October 2013). 
<http://studylib.net/doc/14435705/’liberation--cloaking-devices-and-the-law.’> accessed 15 February 2017. 
16 Tina Minkowitz, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the right to be 
free from nonconsensual psychiatric interventions’ (2006-7) 34 Syracuse Journal of International Law and 
Commerce 405. 
17 ‘Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities’ (UN Enable) 
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/adhoccom.htm> accessed 15 February 2017> 
18 Dhanda (n 4); Minkowitz (n 16); Arlene Kanter, The Development of Disability Rights Under International Law: 
From Charity to Human Rights (Routledge 2015); Marianne Schulze, ‘Understanding The UN Convention On The 
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The CRPD was negotiated over eight sessions of an Ad Hoc Committee between 2002 and 2006. There 
was a very high level of participation of disability organisations in the negotiations, attending and 
observing formal and informal discussions of the AHC, submitting proposals and making comments at 
the end of each session (and sometimes even during sessions).  
At the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee a large group of disabled people’s organisations (DPOs) 
and allied NGOs joined together to form the International Disability Caucus (IDC) to provide a 
‘representative voice’ for disabled people during the Ad Hoc Committee negotiations.19 The World 
Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry (WNUSP) and Inclusion International, an organisation of 
people with intellectual disabilities and their families, were particularly prominent in the negotiations 
of article 12 CRPD.  
The involvement of DPOs in the negotiations of the CRPD is central to its ‘nothing about us without 
us’ ethos. This ethos is now encoded in article 4(3) CRPD, requiring states parties to ‘closely consult 
with and actively involve persons with disabilities… through their representative organisations’ when 
developing policy or legislation that affects them. This role raises difficult questions about the politics 
of representation within the disability and user and survivor of psychiatry movements.20 Lord has 
questioned how representative those NGOs negotiating the Convention were for more ‘moderate’ 
user groups and for the Global South.21 Some survivor activists have expressed the view that not all 
views within this community were represented within the advocacy strategy adopted during the 
negotiations.22 Jones and Kelly raise concerns more generally about ‘representational over-reach’ 
within user and survivor movements, highlighting the heterogeneity of this group.23 One key group 
directly affected by article 12 – perhaps the main group in industrialised countries - is people with 
dementia, yet their presence in article 12 CRPD negotiations appears to have been limited.24 Lest these 
concerns should be seen as diminishing the representational legitimacy of the CRPD, however, it 
should be recalled that it is still regarded as the most inclusive human rights treaty drafting process in 
the UN’s history, and a template for future treaty negotiations.25 
Reina describes ‘Unity’ as an essential strategy for the IDC’s advocacy: within the IDC opposing 
positions could be discussed, meanings could be negotiated and some points of view were ultimately 
                                                          
Rights Of Persons With Disabilities’ (Handicap International 2010) <http://incfit.org/node/279> accessed 15 
February 2017; Rosemary Kayess and Philip French 'Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities' (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 1-34; Equal Rights Trust, 'Promoting 
a Paradigm Shift – ERT talks with Gábor Gombos and Gerard Quinn about the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol' (2008) 2 The Equal Rights Review 83-96; Maria Reina, 'How 
the International Disability Caucus worked during negotiations for a UN Human Rights Convention on Disability' 
(Global Action on Aging 2008) <http://globalag.igc.org/agingwatch/events/CSD/2008/maria.htm> accessed 15 
February 2017. 
19 Reina, ibid. 
20 On which, see: Shaping Our Lives, Beyond the usual suspects (2013) 
<http://www.shapingourlives.org.uk/documents/BTUSReport.pdf>. 
21 Janet Lord, 'Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Voice Accountability and NGOs in Human Rights Standard Setting' 
[2004] Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 93. 
22 Plumb, in Spandler, Anderson and Sapey (n 5Error! Bookmark not defined.). 
23 Nev Jones and Timothy Kelly, ‘Inconvenient complications: on the heterogeneities of madness and their 
relationship to disability’, in Spandler, Anderson and Sapey (n 5). 
24 However, these issues are being revisited as part of the negotiations of a possible UN Convention on the Rights 
of Older Persons, see Eilionóir Flynn, 'Disability and Ageing: Bridging the Divide? Social Constructions and Human 
Rights' in Peter Blanck, Eilionóir Flynn and Gerard Quinn (eds) A Research Companion to Disability Law (Ashgate 
2015). 
25 Kanter (n 16). 
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‘sacrificed’, but in front of governments all IDC members supported the position reached. Reina writes 
that this approach required creativity and ‘tolerating Ambiguity… an inevitable consequence of being 
simultaneously different and unified.’26 Ambiguity is a central theme in the history and literature of 
article 12. On the one hand, it might be regarded as a shortcoming - ambiguity is rarely a desirable 
quality in law – yet arguably this very ambiguity has allowed the new paradigm to achieve the 
prominence it has, from the negotiations, through ratification to the present day.  
At the second Ad Hoc Committee meeting in 2003 a working group was established to develop a draft 
Convention. It comprised representatives from States parties as well as NGOs, and included prominent 
scholars and activists such as Tina Minkowitz (representing WNUSP), Gerard Quinn (representing 
Rehabilitation International), and Theresia Degener (representing Germany), who went on to chair the 
CRPD Committee. Minkowitz recounts that the ‘paradigm shift crystallised’ during the 2004 working 
group.27 
The working group had at its disposal a number of drafts and proposals for the Convention submitted 
by various states and NGOs28, illustrating diverse starting points. Proposals by India and the Chair of 
the Ad Hoc Committee mentioned the use of guardianship. Proposals by the EU and the World Blind 
Union emphasised rights to self-determination closely connected to legal capacity. The International 
Disability Alliance (IDA), whose members included WNUSP and Inclusion International, called for 
‘Recognition as a person before the law’. Separate proposals by WNUSP emphasised the importance 
of not differentiating legal status ‘on account of actual or perceived disability’, asserted that ‘no 
person shall be deprived of the legal capacity to assert rights in her or his own behalf’, and called for 
‘a right to be provided with advocacy assistance and other reasonable accommodation with the aim 
of giving effect to the person’s own decisions.’ Inclusion International’s proposal called for the 
abolition of ‘paternalistic guardianship laws’.  
The working group text formed the basis of the negotiations for article 12 (at that time, article 9). The 
draft required all States parties to ‘recognise persons with disabilities as individuals with rights before 
the law equal to all other persons’, an early version of article 12(1). It contained an equality 
requirement, that states parties ‘accept that persons with disabilities have full legal capacity on an 
equal basis as others’, the precursor to article 12(2). It required States parties to ensure access to 
‘assistance’ with understanding, communicating, and expressing ‘choices and preferences’ and 
performing various legal acts, a precursor to article 12(3). It also made provision for safeguards for 
this ‘assistance’, anticipating article 12(4). However, the draft also stated that ‘relevant decisions are 
taken only in accordance with a procedure established by law and with the application of relevant 
legal safeguards’, with a footnote to this paragraph stating that it should ‘apply only in exceptional 
circumstances, for which legal safeguards must be provided’. The footnote also queried whether this 
paragraph was sufficiently clear and ‘how best to protect persons with disabilities who cannot exercise 
their legal capacity’. The final paragraphs addressed matters relating to property, credit and financial 
affairs, which formed the basis of article 12(5). 
                                                          
26 Reina (n 16). 
27 Tina Minkowitz, 'CRPD and transformative equality' (2017) 13(1) International Journal of Law in Context 77-
86. 
28 UN Enable, ‘Compilation of proposals for elements of a Convention, as of 15 January 2004 (Combining 
Compilation of proposals for a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention to Promote and Protect 
the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, UN Doc A/AC.265/2003/CRP/13 (16-27 June 2003) and the 
NGO contributions to the elements of a convention, UN Doc A/AC.265/2003/CRP.13/Add.1) (2004). 
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/comp-element0.htm> accessed 19 January 2017. 
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The records of the Ad Hoc Committee discussions show that early on many participating states 
expressed confusion or disagreement about the meaning of ‘legal capacity’. Some states distinguished 
between the ‘capacity to hold and bear rights’ and the ‘capacity to act’, arguing that whilst the former 
could not be limited the latter could be. In part this disagreement mirrored different understandings 
of legal capacity in the various legal systems.29 This distinction was strongly opposed by the IDC, as the 
‘capacity to act’ was deemed vital for self-determination. 
An alternative Canadian proposal to the working group text garnered considerable support among 
participating states. Although it made reference to equality and support principles, it explicitly 
permitted a ‘competent, independent and impartial authority’ to ‘find a person unable to exercise 
their legal capacity with support’, and to appoint ‘a personal representative to exercise the legal 
capacity on the person’s behalf’.30 Contrasting proposals were put forward by the IDC, which outlined 
key elements of support for the exercise of legal capacity and did not describe any procedure for 
restricting legal capacity.31 The IDC proposal emphasised the importance of trust, and of not imposing 
support against a person’s will. It called for legal standards for support mechanisms, including the 
obligation to ‘respect the will and preferences of the individual concerned’, which is reflected in the 
final text of article 12(4). 
Many participating states supported the Canadian proposal, but it was adamantly opposed by many 
NGOs. At the fifth Ad Hoc Committee in 2005 the Committee explicitly discussed whether the 
Convention should only permit supported decision-making and prohibit substitute decision-making.32 
Whilst many participating States recognised the importance of supported decision-making, they felt 
the Convention should permit substituted decision-making in exceptional circumstances. The IDC was 
adamant that the Convention should abolish substituted decision-making, and that it could not coexist 
alongside supported decision-making. At the seventh session the Ad Hoc Committee chair sought 
clarification from the IDC as to whether there were not any ‘extreme cases’ requiring substitute 
decision-making or guardianship.33 The IDC’s response reveals a distinction between supported and 
substituted decisions that is central to understanding the support paradigm: 
The difference between supported and substitute decision-making is that, in a 
supported situation, the person with a disability is at the center of the discourse. 
The premise of supported decision-making is that it ranges from zero to 100 per 
cent and is a dynamic concept. 
Asked by the Chairman whether ‘100 per cent support’ was not in fact substitute decision-making, the 
IDC representative responded that: ‘[t]he IDC goal is to not legitimize guardianship; a need for 100 per 
cent support would become 99 per cent, then 98 per cent, and so on. The IDC’s concept of supported 
                                                          
29 Istvan Hoffman and Gyorgi Konczei, ‘Legal Regulations Relating to the Passive and Active Legal Capacity of 
Persons with Intellectual and Psychosocial Disabilities in Light of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities and the Impending Reform of the Hungarian Civil Code’ (2011) 33 The Loyola Los Angeles 
International and Comparative Law Review 143-172. 
30 Proposals submitted at the fourth session of the Ad Hoc Committee. 
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahcstata12fscomments.htm#canada> accessed 19 January 
2017. 
31 Proposals submitted at the fourth session of the Ad Hoc Committee. 
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahcstata12fscomments.htm#idc> accessed 19 January 2017. 
32 Travaux préparatoires (25 January 2005) <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc5sum25jan.htm> 
accessed 19 January 2017. 
33 Travaux préparatoires (18 January 2006) <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc7sum18jan.htm> 
accessed 19 January 2017. 
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decision-making was thus far broader than might intuitively be thought; it applied even to 
circumstances where a person could not express a choice so long as they were ‘at the center of the 
discourse’. This approach will be revisited under article 12(3) and article 12(4) CRPD below. 
Towards the final Ad Hoc Committee sessions, a new text bracketed a paragraph allowing for the 
appointment of a personal representative. Some states sought its inclusion so as to impose safeguards 
on the use of guardianship, but the IDC insisted that such language be removed as it would simply 
reinforce ‘the traditional abusive systems’.34 Canada’s proposal to maintain silence on whether the 
Convention should permit substituted decision-making received support from the IDC and many 
states. Some, however, insisted the Convention should permit guardianship and many informal 
discussions ensued in order to try and break the stalemate. Dhanda recounts that a group of states 
produced a new text that attempted to combine some of the safeguards for guardianship with those 
that had been proposed for supported decision-making: ‘It was a periscope-like construction of the 
crucial paragraph so that each person could see what they desired in the paragraph, and thus provide 
consent to the proposal’.35 This proposed text received the support of the majority of states, ultimately 
becoming article 12(4). 
At the final Ad Hoc Committee meeting in 2006, a footnote appeared in the consensus text stating 
that ‘In Arabic, Chinese and Russian, the term “legal capacity” refers to “legal capacity for rights”, 
rather than “legal capacity to act”’.36 No negotiations or deliberations had discussed this footnote.37 
It caused consternation among the DPOs, who viewed legal capacity to act as critical, and amongst 
‘legal and diplomatic forces’ because, Schulze writes, ‘A footnote is an unheard of feature in an 
international agreement of this kind. Allowing it to remain would have created a string of legal 
complications, the implications of which were inestimable’.38 After heated negotiations, the footnote 
was removed. 
Echoing Reina’s observation that ambiguity was necessary to achieve unity for the IDC, the final text 
of article 12 CRPD remains silent on the pivotal question of whether the Convention permits or 
prohibits substitute decision-making. Consequently, the travaux are a focus of interest for those 
attempting to resolve legal ambiguities surrounding article 12. Dhanda, a prominent advocate of 
universal legal capacity and participant in the negotiations, recognises that the text ‘does not prohibit 
substituted decision-making and there is language which could even be used to justify substitution’, 
but argues that it cannot be read divorced from the process of advocacy and negotiation.39 Martin and 
others, however, highlight the deliberate silence on substitute decision-making and argue that ‘[n]o 
state representative addressed this question by saying explicitly that substitute decision-making 
should be abolished.’40 They conclude on the basis of their analysis of the travaux that there is no 
warrant for the conclusion that the framers of the CRPD intended to abolish substitute decision-
                                                          
34 Travaux préparatoires (18 January 2006) <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc7sum18jan.htm> 
19 January 2017.  
35 Dhanda (2006-7) (n 4) 450. 
36 UN Enable, ‘Interim report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral 
International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities 
on its eighth session’ (1 September 2006) UN Doc A/AC.265/2006/4 
37 Schulze (n 16); Dhanda (2006-7) (n 4). 
38 Schulze (n 18) 88. 
39 Dhanda (2006-7) (n 4) 460-1. 
40 Wayne Martin and others, ‘The Essex Autonomy Project Three Jurisdictions Report: Towards Compliance with 
CRPD Article. 12 in Capacity/Incapacity Legislation across the UK’ (Essex Autonomy Project, University of Essex 
2016) 58 < https://autonomy.essex.ac.uk/resources/three-jurisdictions-report-towards-compliance-crpd-art-
12-capacityincapacity-legislation-across-uk/> accessed 15 February 2017. 
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making. This view is not universally shared. Some states did accept the premise of universal legal 
capacity, without exception,41 although many more argued for substitute decision-making to be 
retained. Kanter highlights that many challenged the footnote that would have restricted rights to 
legal capacity to hold a right, but not to exercise it.42 Schulze believes that ‘[in] the end, the shift from 
substituted decision-making to supported decision-making was achieved’, the result of ‘tedious, 
detailed and sometimes excruciating discussions’.43  
Canada, the Netherlands, Australia, Poland, Egypt, Estonia, Singapore and Norway all submitted 
interpretive declarations when ratifying the CRPD stating that they understand article 12 to permit 
substitute decision-making, deprivation of legal capacity or guardianship.44 In its early concluding 
observations on the initial reports of States parties to the CRPD, the CRPD Committee called upon 
states to replace regimes of substitute decision making by supported decision making,45 although 
offered little further detail explaining what this entailed.  In 2014 the CRPD Committee adopted 
General Comment No 1 on article 12 (‘General Comment No 1’)46 to dispel a ‘general 
misunderstanding’ of state obligations under article 12 and to emphasise that ‘the human rights-based 
model of disability implies a shift from the substitute decision-making paradigm to one that is based 
on supported decision-making’.47 The Committee’s interpretation is not unanimously shared,48 and 
has been met with a frosty reception by medical professionals in particular,49 who have expressed 
confusion and concern about the implications of the General Comment. 
In the final analysis, much comes down to what ‘substituted decision-making’, ‘supported decision-
making’ and ‘exercising legal capacity’ are taken to mean. These should be recognised as terms of art 
within the literature on universal legal capacity; it should not be assumed that they carry their intuitive 
or traditional meaning.50 Asked about the footnote controversy, the chair of the Ad Hoc Committee 
stated that ‘any nuances in translation would be worked out throughout time and would depend on 
                                                          
41 At the 4th session of the AHC Mexico and Lebanon argued against surrogate decision-making (26 August 2004) 
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc4sumart09.htm> accessed 15 February 2017. 
42 Kanter (n 16). 
43 Schulze (n 18). 
44 Signatories and ratifications to the CRPD, and reservations and declarations, can be viewed on the UNTS 
website: <https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
15&chapter=4&clang=_en> accessed 15 February 2017. 
45 See, for example, CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations on Tunisia, UN Doc CRPD/C/TUN/CO/1 (13 May 
2011); Spain, UN Doc CRPD/C/ESP/CO/1 (19 October 2011); Peru, CRPD/C/PER/CO/1 (9 May 2012); China, 
CRPD/C/CHN/CO/1 (27 September 2012); Argentina, CRPD/C/ARG/CO/1 (8 October 2012); Australia, 
CRPD/C/AUS/CO/1 (21 October 2013). 
46 See (n 4). 
47 General Comment No 1, para 3. 
48 Martin and others (n 38); Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in 
Commonwealth Laws: Final Report, (ALRC Report 124, 2014). 
49 Melvyn Freeman and others, 'Reversing hard won victories in the name of human rights: a critique of the 
General Comment on Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities' (2015) 2 Lancet 
Psychiatry 844-850; John Dawson 'A realistic approach to assessing mental health laws' compliance with the 
UNCRPD' (2015) 40 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 70–79; Paul S Appelbaum, 'Protecting the Rights 
of Persons With Disabilities: An International Convention and Its Problems' (2016) 67 Law & Psychiatry 366-368. 
50 For example, when Martin and others (n 38) argue that Art 12 does not prohibit substitute decision-making, 
this is based on their ‘intuitive’ interpretation of ‘substitute decision-making’ and not necessarily that intended 
within the General Comment and elsewhere in the literature (at 12 and Appendix C). 
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State practice’.51 The Australian Law Reform Commission recommended withdrawing Australia’s 
interpretive declaration on article 12, as ‘driven by conceptual confusion that is impeding reform’.52  
Despite ongoing controversies, article 12 has influenced domestic and regional law-making bodies. It 
has been considered in many rulings of domestic and regional courts53, domestic reforms to legal 
capacity legislation,54 and statements and reports by other agencies and rapporteurs within the UN 
system, including the World Health Organization.55 Regional bodies including the European Union56 
and the Organization of American States57 have reviewed the practices of member states against the 
standards of article 12. 
 
Commentary on Equal Recognition before the Law 
 
The title of article 12, ‘equal recognition before the law’, can be found in the text of article 7 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)58 and article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR).59 Article 26 ICCPR provides a broad guarantee against discrimination. It 
identified several groups with protected characteristics at heightened risk of discrimination; disabled 
people were not on this list. The CRPD can be viewed as rectifying the invisibility of disabled people 
under earlier human rights instruments.60  
 
Para 1 
 
                                                          
51 ‘Press Conference on Convention Concerning Rights of Disabled Persons’ (United Nations 13 December 2006) 
< http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/061213_Disabilities.doc.htm> accessed 15 February 2017. 
52 Australian Law Reform Commission (n 46) para 2.59. 
53 Anna Lawson and Lisa Waddington (eds) Domestic Interpretation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities: A Comparative Analysis, (OUP 2017). 
54 For a review of recent developments, see: Robert Dinerstein, 'Emerging international trends for practices in 
guardianship laws for people with disabilities' (2016) 22 ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 435-
460. 
55 UNCAT, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, Juan E. Méndez’ UN Doc A/HRC/22/53 (1 February 2013); UNCAT, ‘Interim report of the Special 
Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak’ UN 
Doc A/63/175 (28 July 2008); World Health Organization, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and 
other UN Agencies, Eliminating forced, coercive and otherwise involuntary sterilization: An interagency 
statement (2014); World Health Organization, WHO Quality Rights Tool Kit: Assessing and improving quality and 
human rights in mental health and social care facilities (WHO 2012). 
56 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Legal capacity of persons with intellectual disabilities 
and persons with mental health problems (2013). 
57 Organization of American States, ‘Final Report of the Third Special Meeting of the Committee for the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities (CEDDIS)’ (10 January 2014) 
OEA/Ser.L/XXIV.3.3. 
58 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (10 December 1948). 
59 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 6 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). 
60 Dhanda (2006-7) (n 4); Kanter (n 16). 
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States parties reaffirm that persons with disabilities have the right to recognition 
everywhere as persons before the law 
 
Article 12 CRPD relates to both legal personality and the legal capacity to act. To have legal personality 
is to be able to bear rights and duties under law.61 It is intimately connected with philosophies of 
personhood,62 but it is possible to be a natural person (that is, a human) and not be recognised as a 
legal person, or for non-human entities to be granted legal personality. For example chattel slaves in 
the USA were not legal persons within the civil law system.63 Meanwhile today, some animals have 
been recognised as legal persons in some jurisdictions64 and Bolivian legislation grants legal 
personality to ‘Mother Earth’.65 It is important to recognise that the mere conferral of legal personality 
does not specify what rights or duties are held, or how they are exercised; this falls within the remit 
of legal capacity (discussed under article 12(2)). 
The first paragraph of article 12 CRPD is based on article 6 UDHR and article 16 ICCPR: ‘Everyone has 
the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law’. These rights were crafted to address 
the situation of colonized peoples who had systematically been denied legal personality by colonial 
regimes.66 Article 12(1) CRPD requires states parties to recognise all persons with disabilities as legal 
persons, capable of bearing rights and duties within both civil and criminal justice systems. Kanter 
writes that ‘Any law or practice by which a person with disability is not registered at birth, refused a 
document of identity or disqualified from inheriting property or otherwise recognized under the law, 
would be a violation of article 12(1)’.67 
 
Para 2 
States parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal 
basis with others in all aspects of life. 
A person may enjoy legal personality – the status of being a bearer of rights and duties under law – 
but be unable to exercise legal capacity him or herself because of the operation of guardianship or 
other laws restricting legal capacity. Legal capacity is an elusive concept, however. 
                                                          
61 Richard Tur, ‘The "person" in law’, in Arthur Peacocke and Grant Gillett (eds) Persons and Personality: A 
Contemporary Inquiry (Blackwells 1987). 
62 Ngaire Naffine, 'Who are Law's Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects' (2003) 66 The Modern 
Law Review 346-367. 
63 Colin Dayan, The Law is a White Dog: How Legal Rituals Make and Unmake Persons (Princeton University Press 
2011); Steven Wise, Though the Heavens May Fall: The Landmark Trial That Led to the End of Human Slavery (Da 
Capo Press 2005). 
64 Steven Wise, Rattling the Cage: Towards Legal Rights for Animals (Da Capo Press 2014); Presented by AFADA 
about the Chimpanzee 'Cecilia' - Non human individual, File no P-72.254/15 before the Third Court of Guarantees 
in Mendoza, Argentina (3 November 2016), non-official English translation 
<http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Chimpanzee-Cecilia_translation-
FINAL-for-website.pdf> accessed 15 February 2017. 
65 La Ley Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para Bien (“Framework Law of Mother Earth and Integral 
Development for Living Well”, Law 300, passed by Bolivia's Plurinational Legislative Assembly on October 15, 
2012);  
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Defining legal capacity 
 
Article 12(2) CRPD is only the second UN human rights treaty to use the term ‘legal capacity’. The first 
was article 15(2) of the UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW)68, which provides: 
States parties shall accord to women, in civil matters, a legal capacity identical to 
that of men and the same opportunities to exercise that capacity. In particular, 
they shall give women equal rights to conclude contracts and to administer 
property and shall treat them equally in all stages of procedure in courts and 
tribunals. 
CEDAW addresses legal capacity because many women have been denied basic rights to own property, 
access credit, engage in contracts, vote, give witness testimony etc, either at all or without their 
husband’s or male relatives’ consent.69 In the eighteenth century William Blackstone referred to this 
phenomenon as ‘civil death’.70 
Legal capacity is intimately connected with autonomy. Quinn describes its significance as ‘a sword to 
enable one to make one’s own choices’ and ‘a shield fending off others’ purporting to make decisions 
for us.71 
The term ‘legal capacity’ has no internationally agreed upon definition.72 It is often described by way 
of ‘canonical examples’73 such as entering into a contract, getting married, voting, giving or refusing 
consent to medical treatment, etc.74 It has a bearing on such diverse matters as instructing legal 
representatives,75 consent to sexual relationships76 and state interventions to protect adults at risk of 
abuse or neglect by others.77 
Legal capacity may be restricted formally – through an administrative or court declaration of 
‘incapacity’ – or informally, for example through defences that permit acts that would ordinarily be 
                                                          
68 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted 18 December 1979, 
entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13 (CEDAW) 
69 CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 21 Equality in marriage and family relations (13th session 1994). 
70 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: A Facsimile of the First Edition of 1765–1769 with 
an Introduction by Stanley N. Katz, (Blackwells 1979). 
71 Gerard Quinn, ‘Legal Capacity Law Reform: The Revolution of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disability’ (Frontline: the voice of intellectual disability, issue 83, 2 August 2011) < http://frontline-
ireland.com/legal-capacity-law-reform-the-revolution-of-the-un-convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-with-
disability/> accessed 15 February 2017. 
72 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (n 54) 9. 
73 Martin and others (n 40) 7. 
74 Bernadette McSherry, ‘Legal capacity under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2012) 
20 Journal of Law and Medicine 22-27. 
75 Lucy Series, ‘Legal capacity and participation in litigation: Recent developments in the European Court of 
Human Rights’ (2015) 4 European Yearbook of Disability Law 103-128. 
76 Anna Arstein-Kerslake, ‘Understanding sex: the right to legal capacity to consent to sex’ (2015) 30 Disability & 
Society 1459-1473; Lucy Series, ‘The Use of Legal Capacity Legislation to Control the Sexuality of People with 
Intellectual Disabilities’, in Tom Shakespeare (ed.) Disability Research Today: International Perspectives, 
(Routledge 2015) 149 - 165. 
77 Eilionóir Flynn and Anna Arstein-Kerslake, ‘State Intervention in the Lives of People with Disabilities: The Case 
for a Disability Neutral Framework’ (2017) 13 International Journal of Law in Context 1, 39. 
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regarded as unlawful violations of bodily integrity or interferences with property.78 The CRPD 
Committee has highlighted that even states, such as Sweden, that have abolished formal declarations 
of incapacity, forms of substitute decision making may remain.79  There may also be de facto 
restrictions on legal capacity whereby, despite the absence of any source of law restricting the legal 
capacity of disabled people, society functions in such a way that systematically denies them ordinary 
legal rights to self-determination.  In some of its concluding observations on article 12, the CRPD 
Committee has raised concerns about ‘de facto guardianship’ through customary practices such as 
families preventing disabled relatives from making choices about marriage, buying food or renting a 
house, or inheriting.80 
A legal opinion on article 12 CRPD, signed by thirty-one legal experts from around the world, defines 
legal capacity as consisting of ‘the capacity to hold a right and the capacity to act and exercise the 
right, including legal capacity to sue, based on such rights’.81 General Comment No 1 defines legal 
capacity as including the capacity to be a ‘holder of rights’, entitling ‘the person to full protection of 
his or her rights by the legal system’, and the capacity to be ‘an actor under law’, recognised ‘as an 
agent with the power to engage in transactions and in general to create, modify or end legal 
relationships’.82 
Because the concept of legal capacity is so fluid, it is difficult to draw a line around which acts in 
everyday life constitute possible expressions of legal capacity and thereby what constitutes a 
restriction on legal capacity. Not all acts and decisions are legal acts. Whether an act constitutes an 
exercise of legal capacity varies according to custom and jurisdiction. It depends upon both the nature 
of the act – whether it is legal in character – and the actor, whether they are recognised as having 
made a legally effective choice or performed a legally effective act, with all the resultant rights and 
responsibilities this entails.  
In cultures where fewer acts and decisions are regulated by law, the barriers to one’s decisions being 
accorded respect and recognition may be informal rather than restrictions on legal capacity per se.83 
In contrast, the increasing ‘juridification’84 of everyday life and interpersonal relations in some 
societies means that legal capacity may be formally engaged even for quite mundane acts and 
decisions. For example, in England and Wales, capacity laws are regarded as potentially relevant to 
                                                          
78 Alex Ruck Keene, ‘Powers, defences and the ‘need’ for judicial sanction’ (2016) Elder Law Journal 244; Piers 
Gooding and Eilionóir Flynn, ‘Querying the Call to Introduce Mental Capacity Testing to Mental Health Law: Does 
the Doctrine of Necessity Provide an Alternative?’ (2015) 4 Laws 245-271. 
79 CRPD Committee, ‘Concluding Observations on Sweden’, UN Doc CRPD/C/SWE/CO/1 (12 May 2014) para 33. 
80 CRPD Committee, ‘Concluding Observations on Kenya’, UN Doc CRPD/C/KEN/CO/1 (30 September 2015) paras 
23 and 24, and Uganda, UN Doc CRPD/C/UGA/CO/1 (12 May 2016) paras 22 and 23. 
81 Santos Cifuentes and others, ‘Legal Opinion on Article 12 of the CRPD’ (University of Leeds Disability Studies 
Group Archives, 2008) < http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-
studies/archiveuk/legal%20opinion/LegalOpinion_Art12_FINAL.pdf> accessed 15 February 2017. 
82 Para 11. 
83 For an example of this, see: Elizabeth Kamundia, ‘How to implement Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities regarding legal capacity in Kenya: A briefing paper’ (The Kenya National Commission 
on Human Rights and the Open Society Initiative for Eastern Africa, 2013). 
84 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist 
Reason (Beacon Books 1987). 
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everyday decisions such as when a person gets up and what they eat85; there has even been litigation 
over shaving pubic hair.86  
The tendency to engage rights to defend everyday acts, such as smoking,87 or eating unhealthy food88 
has been criticised as devaluing wider struggles against ‘tyranny, prejudice and oppression’ and 
expanding the colonisation of life and the social world by law.89 Yet most people take for granted the 
freedom and dignity to make choices in their everyday lives, including poor choices. By contrast, 
disabled people may have to activate the ‘heavy lifting procedures’ of ‘high duty rights’ simply to enjoy 
‘ordinary personal preferences like watching late-night television and waking up late in the morning’90, 
because of the high level of external regulation in their lives.91  
 
Distinguishing legal capacity and mental capacity 
 
Legal capacity is distinct from mental capacity. Mental capacity concerns an individual’s putative 
psychological abilities, whereas legal capacity refers to whether a person’s acts and decisions are 
treated as legally effective within a particular legal system. Almost all legal systems couple restrictions 
on legal capacity to some formulation of mental capacity.92 So called ‘status’ approaches restrict legal 
capacity on a binary categorical status, such as being a detained patient.93 ‘Outcome’ approaches 
restrict legal capacity on the basis of the outcome of a person’s decision – for example, whether it is 
deemed ‘unreasonable’. Increasingly popular ‘functional’ approaches to mental capacity instead 
purport to restrict legal capacity based on the process by which a person makes a decision, rather than 
the outcome of the decision. The origins of functional approaches lie in psychometric tools for the 
clinical assessment of competence to give or refuse consent to treatment, and there is an extensive 
research literature examining their application to different clinical groups.94 Functional tests are also 
sometimes referred to as ‘cognitive’ tests or tests of ‘decision-making capacity’. 
                                                          
85 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice (TSO 2007) 3, paras 1.1, 1.8, 1.8, 
3.3, 5.58, 6.1, 4.38, 4.60, 5.27 and 5.60; Law Commission, Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: 
An Overview (Law Com No 119, 1991) para 1.10. 
86 A Local Authority v ED & Ors [2013] EWCOP 3069. 
87 R (E) v Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 795. 
88 Lyons v Board of the State Hospital [2011] ScotCS CSOH_21. 
89 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge-
Cavendish 2007) p 36. 
90 Amita Dhanda, 'Conversations between the proponents of the new paradigm of legal capacity', (2017) 13 
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Journal of Law in Context 1, 22. 
92 NB: these are not the only restrictions on legal capacity that exist within legal systems. Restrictions on legal 
capacity often also apply to, inter alia, children, prisoners, legal persons that are not natural persons (such as 
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94 Paul S Appelbaum and Thomas Grisso, ‘Assessing patients' capabilities to consent to treatment’ (1988) 319 
New England Journal of Medicine 1635-8; Thomas Grisso and Paul S Appelbaum, ‘Comparison of standards for 
assessing patients' capacities to make treatment decisions’ (1995) 152 American Journal of Psychiatry 1033-
1037; Thomas Grisso and Paul S Appelbaum, ‘The MacArthur Study III. Treatment Competence Abilities of 
Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and Medical Treatments’ (1995) 19 Law and Human Behaviour 149. 
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The Mental Capacity Act 2005 of England and Wales (MCA) is a widely known and influential example 
of a functional approach. The MCA defines an inability to make a decision functionally, as being unable: 
a) to understand the information relevant to the decision, 
b) to retain that information, 
c) to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision, or 
d) to communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any other means).95 
This functional test, or adapted versions thereof, appear increasingly in legislation around the world.96 
There have been longstanding calls for a functional test of capacity to be adopted as a threshold 
criterion for psychiatric detention and forced treatment97 and for the ‘fusion’ of guardianship and civil 
commitment laws based on this principle. Northern Ireland has recently adopted the world’s first 
example of ‘fused’ guardianship and mental health legislation based on the functional approach.98 
Several scholars and law reform bodies maintain that functional tests of mental capacity comply with 
article 12 CRPD.99 
Functional approaches to legal capacity are increasingly popular because they are thought to respect 
autonomy and not to discriminate against disabled people. The autonomy claim is based on the view 
that functional tests are ‘value-neutral’ – that they assess the internal processes of decision-making 
for their ‘autonomous’ character, rather than assessing the outcome of the decision against the 
assessor’s own values. There is a vigorous philosophical literature interrogating this claim100 and a 
                                                          
95 Mental Capacity Act 2005 s3(2) 
96 Internationally, the MCA has influenced law reform proposals in: the Republic of Ireland (Assisted Decision-
Making (Capacity) Bill 2013); Australia (Victorian Law Reform Commission, 2012; Mental Health Act 2013, 
Tasmania; Mental Health Act 2014, Western Australia; Australian Law Reform Commission, 2014); Singapore 
(Mental Capacity Act 2008); and Central and Eastern Europe (Model Act on reasons and procedure for limiting 
and protection of certain rights and liberties, Serbia, 2013; Natural Persons and Support Measures (Draft) Act, 
Bulgaria, 2014; Act on Protection of Persons with Mental Disorders 2014, Croatia, 2014). 
97 Tom Campbell and Chris Heginbotham, Mental Illness: Prejudice, Discrimination and the Law, (Dartmouth 
Publishing Company 1991); John Dawson and George Szmukler, ‘Fusion of mental health and incapacity 
legislation’ (2006) 188 The British Journal of Psychiatry 504-509; George Szmukler, Rowena Daw and Felicity 
Callard, ‘Mental health law and the UN Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities’ (2013) 17 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 245–252; Genevra Richardson, ‘Report of the Expert Committee: 
Review of the Mental Health Act 1983’ (Department of Health 1999). 
98 Mental Capacity Act (Northern Ireland) 2016 SI 2016\18 
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developing literature on coupling functional capacity assessments to the person’s own values.101 
Functional tests have also been criticised for neglecting the relational dimensions of mental capacity 
assessment.102 Because functional approaches are ‘decision specific’, it is easier to tailor restrictions 
on legal capacity to specific areas of concern than traditional criteria for guardianship.  
General Comment No. 1 attacks each of these foundational beliefs about functional tests of mental 
capacity. It is scathing about the presumption that third parties can ‘accurately assess the inner-
workings of the human mind’.103 It asserts that ‘mental capacity is not, as is commonly presented, an 
objective, scientific and naturally occurring phenomenon’104 but is ‘is contingent on social and political 
contexts’.105 It maintains that because under functional tests ‘a person’s disability and/or decision-
making skills are taken as legitimate grounds for denying his or her legal capacity’, they thereby 
constitute a ‘discriminatory denial of legal capacity’ and are incompatible with article 12(2) CRPD.106 
The claim is not that mental incapacity does not exist – the General Comment acknowledges variations 
in decision-making skills across the population.107 Rather, it maintains that mental incapacity should 
not form the basis of restrictions on legal capacity. This claim, that functional tests are discriminatory, 
is pivotal to debates around article 12 CRPD. 
 
Enjoyment of legal capacity ‘on an equal basis with others’ 
 
Article 12(2) CRPD requires that disabled people enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others. 
Yet, equality is a notoriously slippery concept, whose meanings depend on values and policy as much 
as logic.108  
At a minimum, article 12(2) requires that legal capacity regimes do not discriminate against disabled 
people. Article 2 CRPD defines ‘discrimination on the basis of disability’ as:  
any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability which has the 
purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, 
on an equal basis with others, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. It includes all forms 
of discrimination, including denial of reasonable accommodation.  
It is clear that this encompasses both direct and indirect forms of discrimination. 
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Direct discrimination occurs where a group with a protected characteristic (such as disability) is 
explicitly singled out for different treatment that disadvantages members in comparison with others. 
In many jurisdictions restrictions on legal capacity are explicitly based on a person’s disability. This is 
especially true of ‘status’ based approaches to legal capacity, but many laws predicated on a functional 
or outcome approach may also include a diagnostic threshold. For example, under the MCA a person 
who fails the functional test is only treated as lacking mental capacity if this is caused by ‘an 
impairment or disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain’.109 Tellingly, this diagnostic 
threshold was included because: ‘not to have a threshold of mental disorder… places too heavy a 
burden on the functional test… this test is not easy to define or to apply, particularly as to the degree 
of incapacity which is required’.110 Although strictly speaking the MCA’s diagnostic threshold can apply 
to conditions that do not constitute a disability,111 it is increasingly considered to be a form of direct 
discrimination because it explicitly treats people differently on the basis of cognitive impairments.112 
One option for the achievement of formal equality that has been enthusiastically pursued in 
connection not only with respect to article 12 CRPD, but also article 14 on liberty and security of the 
person, is the creation of ‘disability-neutral’ criteria to replace standards for interventions or practices 
that restrict legal capacity, which are currently linked to disability. For example, it has been proposed 
that instead of creating special criminal offences relating to sexual activity with people with mental 
and intellectual disabilities, a disability-neutral approach to consent should be taken based on a more 
universal understanding of vulnerability to sexual abuse and sexual violence.113 Disability neutral 
doctrines may help to challenge the stigma and ‘othering’ of disabled people and shift the focus of 
debates to ‘the legitimate reach of the law into the autonomy of all citizens.’114 They force legislators 
to confront uncomfortable questions about why laws restricting legal capacity are acceptable if 
imposed on people with mental disabilities but not the general population.115  
Yet, disability-neutral doctrines are not a panacea for problems of discrimination. They are difficult to 
frame and apply in a non-arbitrary fashion, and are associated with risks of political abuse.116 Neither 
do disability-neutral standards necessarily assist disabled people currently deprived of legal capacity; 
they may simply widen the net. Paradoxically, this may mean that more disabled people are subject 
to restrictions on legal capacity.117 Some view net widening as positively advantageous, as it means 
that non-disabled people may ‘benefit’ from protective interventions.118 Depending on one’s 
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perspective, disability-neutral standards might be viewed as levelling up or levelling down to achieve 
formal equality. 
More problematic from an equalities perspective is the potential for disability-neutral laws to be 
applied in indirectly discriminatory ways.119 Fredman defines indirect discrimination as having three 
elements: equal treatment, a disproportionately exclusionary impact on those sharing a protected 
characteristic, and the absence of acceptable justification.120 It is based on a comparison between the 
impact an apparently neutral criterion or practice has on a group with the protected characteristic and 
a comparator group. This comparison is often made relying upon statistics. For example, the Czech 
Republic had used IQ tests to determine which children should go to ‘special schools’. Statistics 
demonstrated that these disproportionately impacted on Roma children, and the European Court of 
Human Rights eventually concurred that this was evidence of indirect discrimination.121 Fredman also 
describes an alternative approach from EU law, whereby a statistical demonstration of 
disproportionate impact may not be necessary if it can be demonstrated that a criterion is ‘intrinsically 
liable’ to affect a particular group more than others.122  
Several scholars123 argue that functional tests of capacity (decoupled from diagnostic criteria) are a 
potentially non-discriminatory way of restricting rights to self-determination. For example, Nilsson 
highlights that ‘somatic’ states such as pain or fever, which often occur in the absence of disability, 
may impede decision-making abilities.124 Szmukler, Daw and Callard give an example of a person who 
develops delirium as a result of an adverse reaction to drugs used for heart failure, who may receive 
treatment without consent on the basis of mental incapacity.125 Martin gives the example of ‘someone 
who has had too much to drink on a Saturday night’.126 In other words, they invoke a comparator, to 
make the case that functional tests – because they can be applied to non-disabled persons – are not 
discriminatory.  
The selection of these particular comparators is, however, unlikely to satisfy those making the 
argument that functional tests have a disparate impact on disabled people. This is because the kinds 
of interferences of concern are not the short term interferences that these examples evoke, rather 
they are concerned with abolishing the legal basis for measures such as institutionalisation, forced 
psychiatric treatments, entry into guardianship, involuntary sterilisation, loss of rights to marry and 
found a family or to engage in sexual relationships.127 Adopting fever or concussion etc. as the 
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comparator misses the wider concerns about the consequences of deprivation of legal capacity for 
disabled people that informed advocacy for article 12. Yet, if these concerns are what prompted the 
call for universal legal capacity, it is difficult to see what kinds of non-disabled comparator groups 
would be appropriate, since there are very few instances of these kinds of measures occurring in 
relation to non-disabled people. Thus the identification of appropriate comparators remains a 
significant challenge for those arguing that functional tests are not indirectly discriminatory. 
The counter-claim that functional tests are indirectly discriminatory is made in General Comment No 
1 and in several places in the literature, although it is not always easy to discern precisely what kind 
of indirect discrimination is being identified. Some express concern about the targeting of mental 
capacity assessments at disabled people.128 Others highlight the difficulty of disentangling functional 
incapacity from disability, diagnosis or impairment,129 or claim that a person’s mental impairment 
‘plays a major role in the determination’ of functional capacity.130  
Concerns about targeting assessments of mental capacity towards disabled people are likely to be well 
founded for two key reasons. Firstly, some targeting of tests towards disabled people may undeniably 
occur because of prejudice. In the UK, some physically disabled people have been prevented from 
voting because of perceptions that they are ‘incompetent’.131 But even absent such prejudice, the 
mental capacity of disabled people is disproportionately more likely to be called into question because 
their choices and actions are simply more visible to third parties who might initiate guardianship or 
deprivation of legal capacity procedures if they rely upon others for healthcare or support, whereas 
‘incapable’ decisions made by non-disabled people are less likely to be flagged for intervention. 
Clearly, the requirement that all adults demonstrate ‘mental capacity’ for all decisions would be 
impracticable and hence some targeting would be inevitable for decision-specific approaches. But 
even if a regime of universal mental capacity assessment did exist in some areas – for example, 
suppose any person applying for a marriage license or making a will was required to undergo a test of 
mental capacity – such tests would be inherently liable to identify people with mental disabilities as 
lacking mental capacity because they were designed to pick out specific kinds of cognitive functioning 
that are found more frequently in particular clinical groups than in the general population.132 
Proponents of functional tests would no doubt recognise this, thus presumably their defence of the 
tests as non-discriminatory must rest on justifying their disproportionate impact on disabled people. 
Another disability-neutral approach has focused on harm. These approaches tend to respond to the 
‘troubling moral dilemmas’133 that can arise if the universal legal capacity paradigm prohibits all 
possible tools for non-consensual intervention. Bach and Kerzner propose a framework for 
interventions to prevent ‘serious adverse effects’.134 Gooding and Flynn suggest that the doctrine of 
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necessity, codified in a non-discriminatory way, could replace mental health laws and identify ‘specific 
thresholds for overriding autonomy in emergency circumstances’.135 Flynn and Arstein-Kerslake136 
propose disability-neutral criteria for state interventions ‘based on risk of imminent and serious harm 
to the individual’s life, health or safety’. They argue for a principle of proportionality which would, in 
their view, permit interventions such as preventing a person from jumping from a high building, but 
which would not permit forced feeding or forced medication. Minkowitz raises concerns about the 
absence of a principled distinction in their scheme between those rights to bodily autonomy that are 
protected and those which are limitable137 and Dhanda questions how it differs from the ‘old 
paradigm’.138 
Harm, or its close relative, risk, is already a criterion, along with diagnosis, of many mental health and 
guardianship laws, and has come in for fierce criticism for its poor predictive quality and a detrimental 
impact on relationships between service users and professionals.139 The intervention thresholds 
proposed here appear higher than under most existing mental health and guardianship laws, reflecting 
the principled approach to the ‘dignity of risk’ associated with the universal legal capacity paradigm.140 
However, such proposals are likely to be politically controversial for some States parties, as they 
simultaneously narrow the scope of intervention in situations that some would regard as intolerable 
and expand the scope of compulsory powers to other populations who might be deemed at risk. 
Brosnan and Flynn have attempted to extricate a disability neutral approach to informed consent from 
functional tests of capacity, influenced by feminist approaches to consent to sex.141 They argue that a 
valid consent can only be given in the absence of coercion and power imbalances. If these conditions 
are satisfied, and the person has been provided with appropriate information, then consent is 
provided by the expression of the person’s will and preferences. If the expression of the person’s will 
and preferences is ‘clear’, then any refusals of treatment should be respected. If it is ‘unclear’ then a 
valid ‘informed consent’ may be inferred based on the ‘best interpretation’ of the person’s will and 
preferences (a process discussed under article 12(4), below). Brosnan and Flynn do seem to view 
‘understanding’ as an ‘essential ingredient’ for consent, and suggest that ‘misunderstanding’ 
information might invalidate consent. It could be inferred from these premises that a refusal of 
consent based on a misunderstanding was not a valid refusal, or was ‘unclear’. If so their approach 
does seem to incorporate a minimalist functional test of understanding, in addition to wider relational 
criteria. 
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Legal capacity and criminal law 
Legal capacity is also relevant to questions of criminal responsibility and criminal trial procedures. The 
General Comment on article 12 is silent on questions of criminal responsibility. However, in 2009 the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, stated that article 12 requires the 
abolition of criminal defences ‘based on the existence of a mental or intellectual disability’ and called 
for disability neutral doctrines on the subjective element of a crime.142  More recent concluding 
observations from the CRPD Committee have recommended, under art 14, that States parties review 
and amend criminal legislation to eliminate declarations of non-responsibility on grounds of 
disability.143 
It might be thought surprising that disability rights advocates would argue for the abolition of insanity 
defences that many disabled people rely upon in criminal trials, yet arguably it is the logical corollary 
of the universal legal capacity paradigm. Minkowitz comments that ‘legal capacity entails 
responsibility for one’s acts and choices’.144 Reasons for addressing the insanity defence extend 
beyond formal equality: it is associated with the wider stigma endured by people with mental 
disabilities145 and its deployment typically results not in release from detention but diversion into 
involuntary detention and treatment, aimed at protecting the public and treating the offender. In 
some cases, this confinement may outlast ordinary penal sentences for the alleged offence. Critics of 
the insanity defence accordingly question whether it confers benefits upon disabled people.146 
Appelbaum147 and Perlin148 have expressed concern that the abolition of the insanity defence would 
lead to greater numbers of people with mental disabilities being convicted and imprisoned. Prominent 
user and survivor scholars and activists have also expressed concern. Jones and Shattell argue that 
proposals to sacrifice the ‘interests of individuals who have committed otherwise criminal acts due to 
temporarily but profoundly altered beliefs or states for the sake of a generalized and decontextualized 
“right” to legal capacity’ should be ‘subject to the highest level of critical scrutiny and ethical 
reflexivity.’149 Plumb has expressed concerns about a libertarian ethos and ‘“moral distancing” from 
people who ‘don’t behave well’ during times of great distress or “altered states”’.150 
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Proponents of the abolition of the insanity defence envisage that already existing ‘disability-neutral’ 
defences such as mistake, necessity, duress or self-defence would be available and adapted to address 
the specific circumstances of alleged offenders with mental disabilities.151 Bartlett comments that 
crafting such defences ‘is likely to be a fiercely complex undertaking’.152 The most considered attention 
to this question to date is by Minkowitz153 and Slobogin154.  
Slobogin argues that as mens rea (the mental element of a crime) is increasingly responsive to the 
situation and subjective experience of alleged offenders, the insanity defence has lost much of its 
raison d’etre. Instead, he proposes that by examining the beliefs, emotional state and circumstances 
of the alleged offender at the time of the crime under existing mainstream defences such as duress or 
mistake, people with mental disabilities can be availed of defences that take into account their 
circumstances whilst integrated into the mainstream. However, Slobogin envisages that even those 
acquitted under these defences might be diverted into psychiatric detention if they are still regarded 
as dangerous to society. Minkowitz adapts Slobogin’s approach, but rejects his diversion proposals.155  
Peay questions the extent to which apparently disability-neutral defences, such as duress or mistaken 
beliefs, are truly disability-neutral if they take into consideration beliefs or other elements of mens 
rea that are linked to a person’s mental disorder. 156 Minkowitz addresses this argument head on, 
maintaining that ‘unusual mental phenomena or beliefs’ should be treated like any other perceptions, 
beliefs or worldviews and should not imply the absence of criminal intent. Yet other survivor activists 
are less prepared to draw this equivalence; Anne Plumb comments ‘Most people have some 
questionable or unusual beliefs but there is something about ours that may make them more 
problematic.’157 
Perlin writes that proposed adapted mainstream defences are the insanity defence, but not so 
characterized, and to say otherwise is merely ‘semantics’.158 Yet, ‘semantics’ are important for 
removing the stigma carried by the insanity defence and a cogent argument for ‘mainstreaming’ the 
insanity defence. The more serious problems with the proposals are epistemological and 
consequentialist.  
An inquiry into mens rea – under the insanity defence or mainstream defences – requires an analysis 
of the intentions of the alleged offender. Yet Dawson159 highlights that this entails an assessment of 
the ‘inner-workings of the human mind’ – an undertaking criticised in the General Comment in 
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connection with mental capacity assessments.160 A ‘thin’ understanding of intentionality for the 
purposes of legal capacity, that does not entail understanding the nature of one's acts,161 or which 
treats altered states simply as unusual beliefs, could have stark consequences for those with 
conditions that impair understanding. It is hard to see how to avoid this without an analysis of a 
person’s understanding and beliefs, yet such an analysis again takes us back towards elements of the 
functional test.  
The question of diversion also raises intractable problems. Diversion into psychiatric detention and 
forced treatment is certainly problematic from the perspective of other CRPD rights. Yet without some 
alternative mechanism for public protection, if it is felt that a person’s altered states or limited 
understanding is likely to lead them to repeat the potentially criminal act, then judges and juries face 
an invidious choice: to find the individual guilty and imprison them, or to release them back into the 
community, notwithstanding the danger posed. 
Article 12 is also relevant to criminal trial procedures, although in its concluding observations on states 
parties the CRPD Committee has tended to raise this issue under articles 13 and 14 rather than article 
12.162  In the literature the focus has been on the question of whether a defendant with a mental 
disability is ‘fit to plead’, that is, whether they are able to understand and participate in their trial. 
‘Unfitness to plead’ procedures may involve alternative arrangements that are intended to help secure 
justice both to victims and to defendants unable to participate in their defence. For example, under a 
‘trial of the facts’163 a representative is appointed to defend the accused and make decisions on their 
behalf, but it can only establish the facts and not guilt because it does not determine mens rea.164 Like 
the insanity defence, procedures for defendants deemed ‘unfit to plead’ are often linked to diversion 
into mental health detention, forced treatment, or community supervision, which have been criticised 
by disability rights advocates.165 
The Law Commission in England and Wales has proposed an adapted version of the functional test of 
capacity to assess unfitness to plead in criminal proceedings.166 In their original proposals the Law 
Commission argued for a ‘diagnostic threshold’. Gooding and O’Mahony commented that this would 
be likely to violate article 12(2) CRPD, and ironically render the reforms less compliant than the 
provisions they replaced.167 At consultation the Commission sought the views of prominent disability 
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rights experts168 and – despite opposition from psychiatrists – ultimately decided against including a 
diagnostic threshold. Yet, in part this decision was based on doubt that diagnostic thresholds made 
any real difference either way: they had to be so widely drawn to include all possible barriers to 
participation, and even without a formal threshold, diagnosis could still play a part in assessments.169  
 
Evaluating equalities and discrimination arguments about legal capacity 
 
The concepts of equality and non-discrimination are central to arguments for the universal legal 
capacity paradigm. Yet, these cannot be understood in a purely quantitative sense, since as Dawson 
observes, we cannot fix questions of discrimination without reaching agreement on what constitutes 
disadvantage.170 It is here, I suggest, that the real heat of debates concerning article 12 of the CRPD 
lies, rather than in technical questions of statistical comparisons. 
An argument that a particular legal capacity regime discriminates against disabled people must make 
the case that it disadvantages them. The clear premise of the universal legal capacity literature is that 
deprivation of legal capacity itself is exclusionary and disadvantageous, and results in further 
disadvantages such as guardianship, forced treatment and institutionalisation. Whilst these views 
would be shared by many in the disability and user and survivor movements, they are not universally 
held. Evidence that some regard such interventions as at least sometimes beneficial is widespread. 
Herring argues that ‘best interests’ safeguarding interventions should apply to non-disabled people as 
well, because they are beneficial.171 The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights frames 
life-saving medical treatments against the will of a person who lacks mental capacity as a positive 
obligation under human rights law.172 Some argue that guardianship and mental health laws are a 
critical means of protecting and upholding the rights of people with mental disabilities.173 
Advocates of the universal legal capacity paradigm do not share these views. This literature highlights 
the harms of guardianship, institutionalisation and forced treatment,174 and the existential risks of 
limiting individuals’ opportunities for self-determination, self-expression and thereby flourishing.175 
Many advocates of universal legal capacity would agree with Glover, that many people ‘would prefer 
to forgo a great deal of happiness, or risk a fair amount of disaster, to losing control of our lives in this 
way.’176 Indeed Minkowitz has stated that she ‘would prefer death to another round of forced 
psychiatry’.177 However, some take a more nuanced view.  Plumb argues that the disadvantage is not 
intervention per se, but the kinds of intervention represented by forced psychiatric detention and 
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treatments.178 Evaluations of equality and discrimination claims regarding legal capacity therefor must 
engage with the diversity of views regarding the outcomes of legal capacity and guardianship regimes. 
A secondary question is whether the CRPD permits any justification to outweigh any disadvantage 
experienced by those deprived of legal capacity. Under the ICCPR ‘not every differentiation of 
treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and 
objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant’.179 Nilsson 
argues that although the CRPD text itself is silent on justifications, there is support for such a reading 
of article 2 CRPD in the travaux.180 On this basis, she argues that mental health laws based on 
functional capacity criteria potentially satisfy these tests. Whether functional tests are ‘reasonable’ 
and ‘objective’ lies beyond the scope of this article, but is an important question for those pursuing 
these arguments. 
Presumably securing other rights within the Convention would potentially be a legitimate aim for an 
intervention.  Proponents of protective interventions are likely to emphasise article 16 (protection 
from violence, exploitation and abuse), article 25 (health) and article 10 (the right to life). However, 
this in itself raises a question of how potentially conflicting rights should be balanced, and it is striking 
in this respect that ‘individual autonomy including the freedom to make one's own choices’ appears 
within the CRPD’s first general principle, whereas ‘protection’ is nowhere in that list.181 
The CRPD Committee’s response to a complaint from five adults with intellectual disabilities who were 
deprived of the right to vote because they were subject to guardianship is instructive of how it might 
regard such justifications.  It found that the assessment of individuals’ capacity to vote was 
‘discriminatory in nature’ and thus not serving a legitimate purpose, nor was it ‘proportional to the 
objective to preserve the integrity of the State party’s political system’.182 The Committee thus did 
employ the criteria from the ICCPR for evaluating discrimination claims.  However, its findings in that 
case and its wider views expressed in General Comment No 1 indicate that it is unlikely to regard 
functional tests of capacity as sufficiently objective and reasonable, and unlikely to find measures such 
as forced treatment or institutionalisation as proportionate to serving any legitimate aims within the 
CRPD. 
 
Para 3 
 
States parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities 
to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity. 
Article 12(3) forms the foundation of the ‘support paradigm’ underpinning universal legal capacity. It 
is based on a radical reimagining of legal personality that moves away from what Naffine calls ‘the 
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classic contractor,’183 or what Quinn and Arstein-Kerslake184 call ‘the myth of the masterless man’, 
towards an interconnected and interdependent vision of humanity.185 This approach is influenced by 
social186 and human rights187 models of disability, which view disability as arising from an interaction 
between impairment and social, environmental and other barriers, captured in article 1 CRPD. Yet, 
this vision is not tightly connected to the concept of impairment; Quinn and Arstein-Kerslake maintain 
that it is ‘a cosmopolitan theory of justice that happens to be grounded on disability’.188 It relies on a 
view that all decisions – even those of prime ministers189 – are connected to a network of supports 
and influences.  
 
Support for the exercise of legal capacity 
 
Article 12(3) calls for supports for the exercise of legal capacity. At the risk of pedantry, it is important 
to note that article 12(3) does not itself call for ‘supported decision-making’ – a common gloss put on 
the support paradigm. The CRPD Committee adopts the terminology ‘supported decision-making 
regimes’ to include a wide range of supports for the exercise of legal capacity.190 I take the risk of 
departing from the Committee’s terminology and distinguish between ‘supports for the exercise of 
legal capacity’ – a very broad range of supports and adaptations – and ‘supported decision-making’, 
which is merely one type of support for the exercise of legal capacity, which I consider in more detail 
below. Like Gooding,191 I feel that some of the controversies over the support paradigm can be traced 
to confusion generated by the terminology adopted by the Committee, which leads some to the view 
that all the Convention requires, or permits, is the provision of support to assist individuals make 
decisions for themselves. In fact the support paradigm is far broader than this. 
In the General Comment the Committee has emphasised that ‘“Support” is a broad term that 
encompasses both informal and formal support arrangements, of varying types and intensity’.192 It 
lists examples of supports, including measures relating to universal design and accessibility in banks 
and financial institutions, forms of supported decision making, ‘the development and recognition of 
diverse, non-conventional methods of communication’ and advance planning instruments.193  
The General Comment also includes several statements about how the Committee envisages these 
supports operating. Access to supports, including advance planning instruments and supported 
decision-making, should be available to all and not conditional upon demonstrating particular abilities 
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or ‘mental capacity’.194 A person must have the right not to use support.195 Supports ‘must respect the 
rights, will and preferences of persons with disabilities and should never amount to substitute 
decision-making’.196 It is not sufficient for states to adopt supported decision-making regimes; in order 
to comply with article 12 they must also abolish substituted decision-making regimes.197 
Substituted decision-making is defined as any systems whereby: 1) ‘legal capacity is removed from a 
person’; 2) a substituted decision maker can be ‘appointed’ against the person’s will; or 3) any decision 
made by a ‘substitute decision maker’ is based on ‘the objective “best interests”’ of the person rather 
than their ‘will and preferences’.198 It is important to note that this definition of substituted decision-
making does not include all forms of proxy decision-making. The General Comment acknowledges that 
in some circumstances it is not ‘practicable’ to determine the will and preferences of the person, 
despite the best efforts being made. In those circumstances, the Committee states that ‘the “best 
interpretation of will and preferences” must replace “best interests” determinations’.199 This means 
that provided the proxy is not appointed against the person’s will, and they bases any decisions on 
the ‘best interpretation of will and preferences’ rather than a ‘best interests’ standard, it would fall 
within the support paradigm and not be regarded as a ‘substituted decision’. Within the literature, 
interpretive approaches to will and preferences that could be used in circumstances where a person 
is unable to clearly express their will and preferences have come to be known as ‘facilitated 
decisions’.200  
Critics of the universal legal capacity paradigm such as Freeman and others have argued that because 
of situations such as coma, ‘exceptions have to be considered’ to the prohibition on substitute decision 
making.201 It is unsurprising that critics of the universal legal capacity paradigm struggle to 
comprehend how it can accommodate such situations, since this possibility is not explicitly stated in 
the General Comment, which coyly refers only to more ‘intensive’ supports being sometimes 
necessary.202 However, interpretive approaches such as facilitated decision making are the answer 
found in the literature to the frequently posed ‘coma question’. 
Facilitated decisions do not fall within the technical definition of ‘substitute decisions’ found in the 
General Comment, although echoing the discussions during the Ad Hoc Committee meetings about 
situations of “100 per cent support”, some argue that ‘facilitated decisions’ are substituted decisions 
on any intuitive reading.203 Their categorization as a support is central to the universalist outlook of 
the support paradigm and the advocacy goal of abolishing systems of guardianship. Nevertheless, this 
does lead to some tricky mental gymnastics: who is exercising legal capacity in these situations? In a 
paper on the metaphysics of personhood, Francis and Silvers argue that in situations like these we 
should view the person making the facilitated decision as a kind of prosthesis, with the person they 
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are supporting as actually making the decision.204 Yet, it is unlikely that a person, recovered from any 
impediment to expressing their will and preferences, would regard the decision as one that they had 
made (especially if they felt it did not, in fact, reflect their will and preferences). And, as Arstein-
Kerslake points out, the supporter is not mechanical and traces of their influence on the decision 
cannot be erased.205 Legally speaking, making clear that decisions are made by the supporter ensures 
they are under fiduciary duties towards the person. For this reason, many prefer a clearer recognition 
that the supporter, and not the person, is making the decision.206 
The cost of putting support structures in place is a common concern in the literature.207 The General 
Comment states that ‘State parties must ensure that support is available at nominal or no cost to 
persons with disabilities and that lack of financial resources is not a barrier to accessing support in the 
exercise of legal capacity’.208 It also states that as supports are for the fulfilment of a civil and political 
right, they are not subject to progressive realization.209 Although there are examples of supported 
decision-making schemes that have struggled with limited resources,210 others have reduced the costs 
to the system overall, for example through reducing reliance on emergency welfare and health 
services.211 Many schemes simply formalize existing natural support networks.212 Systems of 
substituted decision-making also incur costs, and supported decision-making should not be regarded 
in isolation from these.213 
 
Supported decision-making 
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‘Supported decision-making’ is a subset of supports for the exercise of legal capacity. It involves 
systems or practices whereby an individual has access to support from one or more trusted persons 
to assist them in making, expressing or implementing a decision. Supporters might help a person to 
consider the pros and cons of different options, help them to communicate their decision to others, 
or even help with its implementation. Critically, under systems of supported decision-making within 
the support paradigm, the individual exercises choice and control over who supports them and how 
they are supported, and they – not the supporter – make the final decision.  
Supported decision-making schemes may be formal – underpinned by legislation – or informal, 
operating without specific legal regulation. The General Comment states that ‘legal recognition of the 
support person(s) formally chosen by a person must be available and accessible’.214 Several 
jurisdictions have, or are considering, statutory schemes for the appointment and legal recognition of 
chosen support persons for decision-making.215 These schemes provide greater control for the person 
supporting them, clearer recognition by third parties of the role of the supporter, and tighter 
regulation of how a person is to be supported, as compared to passively phrased statutory provisions 
which merely state that a person should not be regarded as lacking mental capacity unless support 
has been provided.216 Formalising support relationships in this way means that procedural safeguards 
can be built in to protect against abuse, in accordance with article 12(4).217 However, the existence of 
formal support procedures may risk diluting the perceived legitimacy of informal supporters and could 
also increase the potential for supporters to misrepresent the person. Such dangers would have to be 
addressed through guidance, education and monitoring. 
Several informal supported decision-making schemes have enjoyed considerable success. A pilot 
scheme in South Australia found that supported decision-making provided a viable alternative to 
guardianship in many cases.218 A ‘personal ombuds’ scheme in Sweden provided support for people 
who were reluctant to engage with conventional psychiatric and welfare services; this scheme has 
been so successful that similar models are being set up around the world.219 Other examples of non-
statutory supported decision-making schemes suggested in the literature include: circles of support, 
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joint crisis plans in mental health, Intentional Peer Support, peer advocacy, and even the Finnish Open 
Dialogue model.220 
Although the General Comment maintains that supported decision-making regimes should 
accompany the abolition of substituted decision-making systems, in practice existing schemes operate 
within wider legal frameworks that may still require a demonstration of mental capacity for certain 
decisions to be legally effective. This raises difficult questions about the assessment of relational 
dimensions of mental capacity.221  
In their literature review on supported decision making, Kohn and Blumenthal highlight a lack of 
evidence for, inter alia, the rate of use of supported decision-making in jurisdictions where it is 
available, data on the demographics of those making formalised support agreements and of 
supporters, and the outcomes of supported decision-making schemes. 222 They conclude that it is ‘too 
early to rule out the possibility it may actually disempower individuals with disabilities by facilitating 
undue influence by their alleged supporters’. A more recent systematic review of the literature by 
Davidson and others was more generous in its findings.223 Taking a broad definition of supported 
decision-making (for example, including advance crisis planning), they found: 
1. Varying levels of interest among potential users of supported decision-making schemes to 
actively participate in decisions about their care and treatment; 
2. Some evidence that use of supported decision-making schemes increased users’ decision-
making skills, confidence, engagement with community and sense of control over their own 
lives; 
3. Several studies indicated that ‘implementing SDM is not a simple process, it takes time and 
resources and may require a shift in attitudes of some care providers and in some service 
users themselves’; 
4. The efficacy of support for decision-making is highly dependent on the way in which 
supporters listen to people and present choices and information. 
Like Kohn and Blumenthal, Davidson concluded that the available evidence on implementation and 
impact is limited. They comment that ‘there are important rights-based, effectiveness and pragmatic 
arguments for further developing and researching this approach’.224 The USA-based National Resource 
Center for Supported decision-making has begun a five year longitudinal project to examine whether 
there is a causal link between supported decision-making and increased self-determination.225 
Improving the evidence base for supported decision-making is important, not least for ensuring it 
serves the overarching goals of the CRPD. Yet, there is likewise a dearth of evidence on the operation 
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and effects of substituted decision-making regimes,226 and we should be cautious of holding supported 
decision-making schemes to higher empirical standards than substituted decision-making.  
 
Para 4 
Article 12(4) calls for safeguards against abuse on measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity 
but leaves the nature of such ‘measures’ undefined. As discussed above, this paragraph represents an 
uneasy compromise between those who sought the abolition of substituted decision-making under 
the CRPD and those who viewed some form of guardianship and restrictions on legal capacity as 
inevitable, and thereby in need of safeguards. This paragraph has been the focus of considerable 
scrutiny to resolve these ambiguities.  
 
Respect for the rights, will and preferences of the person 
 
The phrase ‘will and preferences’ in article 12(4) was first proposed by the IDC. It seems reasonable 
to conclude that their intention was to limit as far as possible the scope for coercive interventions, 
such as forced psychiatric treatment, psychiatric detention and guardianship. Yet, as Mladenov writes, 
‘the letter of the CRPD in itself is not enough to secure its meaning’.227 The phrase has become the 
site of hermeneutic struggle, with cracks in its meanings being exploited by those seeking relief from 
some of the hard cases apparently presented by the universal legal capacity paradigm. 
Several proposals for reforms to legal capacity laws in light of article 12 have interpreted this principle 
to require rebuttable presumptions or hierarchical approaches giving primacy to the will and 
preferences of the person, but permitting deviations from this in certain circumstances.228 This is 
unlikely to go as far as some advocates for universal legal capacity wish. 
The CRPD Committee acknowledges that in some circumstances it will not be ‘practicable to 
determine the will and preferences of an individual’. In such circumstances, the General Comment 
states that ‘the “best interpretation of will and preferences” must replace the [sic] “best interests” 
determinations.’ 229 This is the approach taken under facilitated decisions, referred to above. 
Several commentators have highlighted the potential for a person’s ‘will’ to conflict with their 
‘preferences’, or simply to have conflicting ‘will and preferences’.230 This may have a temporal 
dimension – a person’s past expressed will and preferences might conflict with present, less clear or 
stable, expressed will and preferences. There are also situations where a person could be viewed as 
having conflicting desires in the present. Richardson describes a person with severe anorexia, who 
does not want to eat, but does wish to live.231 Flynn and Arstein-Kerslake comment that where a 
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person is self-harming yet rejects assistance ‘a verbal expression in one instance may not necessarily 
represent the true will and preferences of an individual’.232  
Szmukler, a psychiatrist and proponent of fusion law, examines the concept of ‘will’ as it has been 
considered historically, in philosophy and at law, and argues that the will is  ‘founded on a person's 
deeply held, reasonably stable and reasonably coherent personal values’, and that this is ‘not the same 
as a desire, inclination, or a currently held ‘preference’, even a strongly expressed one.’233 On this 
view, Szmukler argues, where a person’s will and preferences appear to diverge it is important to 
identify a person’s ‘authentic will’ through consideration of their past expressed values (written or 
otherwise).  He concludes that interventions that aim ‘at facilitating the expression of the person's 
‘will’, his or her deep values and commitments’ are compatible with the CRPD and would not 
constitute a ‘substitute decision.  A similar approach has recently been taken by the German 
Constitutional Court, relying upon a distinction in German law between a person’s ‘natural will’ 
(natürlichen Willen) and their ‘free will’ (freien Willen).234  The Court held that the Committee’s 
General Comment No 1 did not address the situation where a person was unable to form a ‘free will’. 
There are therefore a number of circumstances where it is argued either that a person’s ‘authentic’ 
will is in conflict with their present preferences, or there are competing interpretations of what a 
person’s ‘authentic will’ consists in.  In such circumstances, as Gooding observes, the adjudication of 
the ‘best interpretation of will and preferences’ will be fraught,235 and presents the danger of what 
Saks refers to as ‘choosing selves’.236 Once it is agreed that a person’s presently expressed apparent 
‘will and preferences’ might not be their authentic ‘will and preferences’, this opens up an inquiry into 
the ‘true’ or authentic intentions of the person. This at least raises the possibility of questions such as 
whether the person ‘understood’ the act or decision, whether they had ‘truly’ evaluated it against 
their authentic beliefs and values. In short, it invites an analysis of the person’s intentionality that 
sounds dangerously close to presuming to assess the ‘inner-workings of the human mind’237, and has 
clear parallels with functional tests of mental capacity. The ‘will and preferences’ paradigm shifts the 
focus from quasi-objective standards of rationality towards authenticity, but this still offers significant 
potential for new bases for coercion. 
In an effort to restrict the potential for the ‘old paradigm’ to colonise the will and preferences 
approach, its proponents have argued for minimalist constructions of intentionality that fix the 
meaning of will and preferences close to the person’s presently expressed views and behaviours. Flynn 
and Arstein-Kerslake, for instance, propose that ‘if in doubt, assume intention in an action, thereby 
allowing it to potentially be an exercise of legal agency’.238 Some propose limits on the decisions that 
could be made using facilitated or interpretive approaches, including sexual consent, decisions with 
‘irreversible’ or ‘significant detrimental impact in the long term’ on the person’s life239, or decisions 
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that raise particular risks of abuse and exploitation because they so fundamentally affect personal 
integrity.240 Another approach to shaping when and how interpretive decisions are made regarding 
the person’s will and preferences is to use the law to prescribe who is responsible for this 
interpretation. Brosnan and Flynn write that (outside of emergencies) ‘it is particularly important that 
a supporter, trusted and chosen by the person, undertakes this task’ and not a healthcare professional, 
who would have a ‘conflict of interest’.241 
 
Conflicts of interest and undue influence 
 
Article 12(4) requires all measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity to have safeguards against 
‘conflicts of interest’ and ‘undue influence’. Several authors have expressed concerns about the 
potential for undue influence and conflicts of interest among supporters,242 although such concerns 
can also arise within substituted decision-making systems.243  
General Comment No 1 recognises that whilst ‘all people risk being subject to “undue influence”’, this 
risk ‘may be exacerbated for those who rely on the support of others to make decisions.’244 It defines 
undue influence ‘as occurring, where the quality of the interaction between the support person and 
the person being supported includes signs of fear, aggression, threat, deception or manipulation.’245 
This formulation of undue influence distinguishes it from mere influence, which is intrinsic to all 
human relations246 and which Martin and others point out ‘might be regarded as positive, beneficial 
and autonomy-enhancing, and therefore as a necessary feature of any supported decision-making 
regime’.247 Similarly, Arstein-Kerslake argues that dependency within support relationships can be 
empowering.248  
‘Undue influence’ over decision making implies that a decision is not an authentic expression of a 
person’s will and preferences. Some jurisdictions operate disability-neutral equitable doctrines exist 
to invalidate any exercise of legal capacity subject to undue influence or related equitable concepts 
such as duress, ‘facility, circumvention, lesion’ (in Scots law) and ‘unconscionable bargain’ (in English 
law).249 Yet for the most part these concepts are deployed in law by the person (or others acting on 
their behalf) as equitable principles to invalidate a legal act that has already taken place; they offer no 
help in shaping preventive safeguards. Nor would they assist in circumstances where a person does 
not recognise themselves as acting under undue influence unless there is a means for a third party to 
act on their behalf and without their consent.  
                                                          
240 Bach and Kerzner (n 132). 
241 Ibid 65. 
242 Adrian Ward, ‘Adults with incapacity: freedom and liberty, rights and status: Part 1’ [2011] Scots Law Times 
21-25; Nina A Kohn and Jeremy A Blumenthal, ‘A critical assessment of supported decision-making for persons 
aging with intellectual disabilities’ (2013) 7 Disability & Health Journal S40–S43; Carter and Chesterman (n 210). 
243 Series (n 100); Re JW [2015] EWCOP 82. 
244 General Comment No 1, para 22. 
245 Ibid. NB: For full disclosure, this phrase appears to have been taken from comments made about the Draft 
General Comment on Article 12 by the author to the CRPD Committee, < 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/DGCArticles12And9.aspx> accessed 28 February 2017. 
246 Series (n 100). 
247 Martin and others (n 38). 
248 Arstein-Kerslake (n 203). 
249 Martin and others (n 38). 
Pre-print chapter by Lucy Series (School of Law and Politics, Cardiff University) for Commentary on UN 
Disabilities Convention, in I Bantekas, M Stein, D Anastasiou (Eds), forthcoming for the Oxford University Press 
in 2018. 
The General Comment states that there must be safeguards to protect against undue influence, yet 
these ‘must respect the rights, will and preferences of the person, including the right to take risks and 
make mistakes’.250 The dilemma, however, is that by definition where a person is subject to undue 
influence, the authenticity of any expression of their will is compromised.  
 
Regular review by a competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body 
The requirement for regular review by a competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial 
body is strongly reminiscent of ‘old paradigm’ instruments such as the MI Principles. For those who 
view article 12 as permitting substitute decision making, these represent important procedural 
safeguards on deprivation of legal capacity and guardianship. As Martin and others argue, this 
provision is rather more difficult to understand if article 12 is interpreted as prohibiting deprivation of 
legal capacity and guardianship, the text appears ‘to reflect the assumption that at least some 
measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity might take the form of limitations or constraints’.251 
Yet as we have seen, some measures envisaged as operating under the support paradigm do bear a 
striking resemblance to substitute decision making, in particular facilitated decision making, any 
provisions permitting emergency interventions or other situations where ‘the best interpretation of 
will and preferences’ approach is adopted. Given the potential for abuse, or even for serious 
disagreement, under these mechanisms, it is conceivable that strong safeguards would be required to 
protect the person’s rights. 
There has, as yet, been little elaboration of the guarantees that would attend any review by a 
competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body in connection with article 12 CRPD. 
It is not discussed by the CRPD Committee in the General Comment or concluding observations on 
article 12. Existing jurisprudence on the right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial 
under the ICCPR,252 and other regional human rights instruments,253 provides a useful starting point. 
However, mainstream human rights approaches to due process guarantees would need to be adapted 
to take into account the specific requirements for disabled people to enjoy effective access to justice 
(on which see article 13 CRPD in this volume). They would also need to reconsider litigation procedures 
in deprivation of legal capacity and guardianship courts which at present frequently involve a litigation 
guardian who may base their representation on their view of the person’s best interests rather than 
their ‘will and preferences’.254  
The safeguards shall be proportional to the degree to which such measures affect the person's rights 
and interests 
 
At present, when most countries provide for deprivation of legal capacity or guardianship in some 
form, safeguards for such measures typically include the aforementioned court or administrative 
procedures for the appointment or review of guardians. Many countries also place monitoring 
requirements upon guardians, requiring them to submit reports about how they are managing the 
person’s affairs to government officials such as a public guardian or public advocate. The frequency of 
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such reviews and monitoring procedures is usually variable, depending upon whether it is considered 
likely that the person’s circumstances will change and the track record of the guardian in managing 
the person’s affairs. 
Court review and monitoring procedures are resource intensive.  Often the cost is borne by the person 
themselves, and they can be experienced as an intrusion on the privacy of the individual and those 
supporting them. Although vital in many cases for protecting the individual from exploitation and 
abuse, they also carry risks of over-regulating the lives of those relying support for the exercise of legal 
capacity. In the event States parties were to move away from systems of guardianship towards the 
kinds of supports described here, it is likely that resource intensive review procedures such as these 
would be reserved for frameworks like facilitated decision making, which carry greater risks of abuse. 
Of those states that have introduced statutory frameworks for supported decision making, most have 
preferred to take a lighter touch approach, in recognition that the person enjoys a higher level of 
autonomy. In British Columbia, for example, some agreements relating to support and representation 
need not be officially registered, but a person can appoint a trusted third party to monitor the 
activities of representative.255 In Ireland, new legislation for supported decision-making agreements 
does not necessarily require them to be registered, but does make provision for official investigations 
in response to complaints or concerns.256 These may offer more proportionate alternative safeguards 
for the emerging support paradigm. 
Paragraph 5 
Introduction 
To be in control over one’s own financial affairs is important for several reasons. It enables one to 
cater for his or her basic needs (food, clothes, accommodation, etc.) and to realize one’s life projects. 
With financial means one can choose what to eat and wear, and where and with whom to live. One 
can pursue an education, spoil loved ones, or simply go to the movies. Many of us take these things 
for granted, but millions of persons with disabilities, in particular persons with intellectual and 
psychosocial disabilities257 are routinely denied control over their financial affairs.258 To address such 
injustices, the CRPD asserts that persons with disabilities are equally entitled to acquire, own, enjoy, 
and dispose private property, and obliges states parties to take all appropriate action to ensure these 
rights in the domestic context. Moreover, states parties must ensure that persons with disabilities 
have equal access to bank loans and other forms of financial credit. In this part of the analysis of article 
12, we will explore what this demand for equal treatment means in light of the preparatory works, 
available jurisprudence and other sources concerning the proper interpretation of the CRPD.259    
Background and Travaux Préparatoires 
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The right to equal enjoyment of property rights was included in the first compilation of proposals for 
a treaty on the rights of persons with disabilities produced by the Working Group of the Ad Hoc 
Committee in January 2004.260 Draft article 9 (e) and (f) read:  
 
States Parties shall: […] 
(e) Take all appropriate and effective measures to ensure the equal right of persons with disabilities 
to own or inherit property, to control their own financial affairs and to have equal access to bank 
loans, mortgages and other forms of financial credit; 
(f) Ensure that persons with disabilities are not arbitrarily deprived of their property. 
 
It is easy to see that this early draft of what later became article 12(5) is almost identical to the final 
version of the treaty text. In the discussions that followed the first draft, the primary point of 
controversy concerned the distinction between the right to own property and the right to administer 
that property,261 and the proper scope of the right to administer property and control one’s financial 
affairs. A number of delegates argued that certain intellectual and psychosocial conditions can have a 
fundamental impact on personal decision-making skills, which warranted restrictions on the right to 
manage one’s financial affairs.262 Others argued against such restrictions, with representatives from 
civil society taking the lead. Variations in cognitive skills ought not to affect the right of persons with 
disabilities to make financial decisions. If people experienced difficulties when making decisions, then 
such challenges could – and should - be met with voluntary support.263 This controversy mirrors the 
general discussion that took place before the Ad Hoc Committee about whether the CRPD should 
reaffirm that persons with disabilities are not only persons before the law (with rights and duties) but 
entitled to legal agency (entitled to make legally binding decisions) and whether such legal agency 
may legitimately be circumscribed under certain circumstances.264 The negotiating parties managed 
to reach agreement by framing the right to legal agency as an entitlement to be enjoyed “on an equal 
basis with others”, and by remaining silent on whether it may be circumscribed.265 The precise 
implications of this compromise is still a matter of legal argumentation and part of an ongoing dialogue 
between the states parties and the CRPD Committee, and between other stakeholders.266   
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The equal right to own and inherit property 
 
The right to own and inherit property is well-established in international human rights law. It is 
recognized by the UDHR267 and protected under several regional human rights treaties.268 These 
treaties prohibit arbitrary deprivation of private property. The CERD and CEDAW complement these 
provisions by specifying that states must ensure that everyone enjoys protection of their property, 
regardless of race, colour, national or ethnic origin,269 sex or marital status.270 Article 12(5) CRPD adds 
to these qualifications (and standards) by clarifying that property rights effectively extend to persons 
with disabilities.  The CRPD does not define what constitutes “property” and neither does any other 
international human rights treaty. A working definition of the term can, however, be gleaned from UN 
declarations and jurisprudence stemming from human rights courts and tribunals. According to a UN 
General Assembly resolution, the right to property covers “personal property, including the residence 
of one’s self and family” and “economically productive property, including property associated with 
agriculture, commerce and industry”.271 The European Court of Human Rights has given the term 
“possessions” (which is the term for property used in the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) an even broader meaning.272 It includes land,273 physical goods,274 shares of stock,275 business 
licenses,276 intellectual property (e.g. copyright and patents)277 and, under certain circumstances, 
welfare benefits (including disability-related ones).278 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has 
interpreted “property” in a similarly comprehensive sense.279  
Property rights are qualified rights in the sense that they may be limited by domestic legislation if 
certain criteria are met. Article 12(5) CRPD prohibits arbitrary deprivation of property, implying that 
non-arbitrary depravation of property can be permissible. The Convention does not, however, provide 
any further details on what constitutes arbitrary interferences with property rights. The ECHR is more 
elaborate on this point; it states that no one shall be deprived of his (or her) possessions “except in 
the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of 
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international law”.280 It continues to clarify that states are permitted to maintain legislation that is 
necessary to ensure payment of taxes and penalties.281 The European Court of Human Rights has 
interpreted this provision to include a requirement of proportionality between the aim(s) behind a 
restriction on the enjoyment of property and its consequences for those affected by the restriction.282 
The absence of such specifications in the CRPD is understandable in view of the purpose of the 
Convention, which is to ensure the equal enjoyment of human rights by persons with disabilities, 
rather than to delineate the scope and content of these rights in other respects.283 Moreover, the 
CRPD’s clear intent is not to create any new rights but instead relies to existing rights and definitions, 
albeit within a disability context.284 
To determine whether a particular obstacle to the enjoyment of property violates the CRPD one must 
consider whether non-disabled persons, in a relevantly similar situation, are subjected to the same 
constraints. Imagine a domestic statute prescribing that persons who inherit money or property must 
pay a tax on their inheritance. Contrast this example with a statute that prescribes that daughters are 
entitled to one-half of a son’s share when inheriting their parents, or a domestic practice that excludes 
persons with disabilities from inheriting land. Whilst all examples involve restrictions on the right to 
inherit property, the latter two are objectionable in the sense that the first one is not. The last example 
meets the definition of disability-based discrimination and violates the CRPD, unless one can 
demonstrate that the practice serves a legitimate aim, is based on objective criteria and is 
reasonable.285 As described by Groce, London and Stein, inheritance is a critical means of transferring 
wealth and means to subsistence (eg a plot of land or a sewing machine) between generations; it can 
provide younger generations with economic independence and help movement out of poverty.286 
Such transfers can, however, also give rise to a number of legitimate concerns: Will the inheritor be 
able to manage the inherited assets? Does he or she need protection to prevent exploitation by third 
parties?.287 The Convention answers such concerns by obliging states to provide protection against 
exploitation and abuse (article 16) and to ensure access to decision-making support (article 12(3)). 
Whilst such measures may involve restrictions of the inheritor’s legal agency (we attend to this 
question in the following section), a categorical exclusion of persons with disabilities as potential 
inheritors cannot be justified under the CRPD or any other source of human rights law.  
 In addition to ensuring that domestic legislation accords with article 12(5), states parties must combat 
discriminatory practices between private actors.288 Though we lack systematic studies on the subject, 
researchers on poverty are routinely apprised of anecdotal stories about how persons with disabilities 
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are passed over when land and other family assets are transferred from one generation to the next.289 
In this context, the situation of women with disabilities deserves particular attention. Patriarchal 
systems persist in several states parties restricting women’s access to land and family assets.290 In such 
settings, women with disabilities face discriminatory practices because of their gender and 
impairment.  
The equal right to control one’s financial affairs 
 
A key facet of the right to property is the right to use one’s assets. The right to own or inherit money 
would lose much of its value if the owner was prevented from using the money to, for example, buy 
something or take the bus to see a friend. As noted above, much of the discussions during the 
negotiations of the CRPD concerned the proper scope of the right to control one’s financial affairs. 
The treaty text delineates this scope by reaffirming that persons with disabilities enjoy an “equal right” 
to control their finances. The precise implications of this obligation are still matters of debate. The 
CRPD Committee has held that the Convention permits restrictions on legal agency on the basis of 
bankruptcy or conviction of a criminal offence.291 Restrictions cannot, however, be based on personal 
traits such as gender, race, or disability.292 Few, if any, would dispute that the presence of a certain 
ethnicity, gender or physical impairment is an insufficient - and in many cases irrelevant - reason to 
circumscribe a person’s right to manage their property. The difficult question is whether the CRPD 
also prohibits restrictions on the right to administer property that are based on reasons linked to 
disability and/or impairment. Some persons with cognitive impairments, for example, have difficulties 
in understanding basic financial concepts (such as quantity, numbers and money) and as a group, 
persons with intellectual disabilities experience more difficulties than ‘the average person’ to 
understand and contemplate about financial choices.293 Moreover, persons with certain psychosocial 
conditions can make very poor financial decisions during their active phases and perform on par with 
others during their inactive phases.294 For these reasons, states have a legitimate interest to prevent 
financial harms that affect persons with certain disabilities in particular. Such protective measures can 
take many forms and target different actors. States may, for example, strengthen consumer 
protection and prohibit certain sales methods or forms of marketing, or develop procedures by which 
harmful contracts can be cancelled if certain criteria are met.295 Article 12(3) obliges states to ensure 
access to support.  
The typical response to the financial risks discussed here is, however, still some form of guardianship 
system where guardians are mandated to make financial decisions on behalf of the person concerned. 
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Two main guardianship models are common practice: plenary and partial guardianship.296 Persons 
under plenary guardianship typically lose all or almost all of their capacity to manage their financial 
affairs. The involvement of a third party – a guardian - is necessary to make legally effective decisions 
on financial matters. Under partial guardianship the individual retains capacity to make certain 
financial decisions, typically the capacity to make smaller everyday transactions. The power to make 
other decisions is transferred to the guardian. Although partial guardianship is less intrusive on the 
individual’s freedom control her assets, such systems tend to ‘spill over’ into other areas.297 
Guardianship systems are problematic for several reasons: they severely restrict individuals’ 
possibilities to enjoy their assets, they prevent financial risk-taking thereby also the possibility to make 
mistakes and learn from them, they expose persons with disabilities to economic exploitation by 
unscrupulous guardians, and they reinforce stereotypical images of persons with disabilities as unable 
to manage their finances.298 The CRPD Committee interprets the CRPD to prohibit all forms of 
guardianship and substituted decision-making299 that involves overriding an individual’s expressed 
preference. According to the Committee, neither variations in decision-making skills nor risks for 
financial harm can justify transfer of decision-making power from the person concerned to a third 
party.300 Most, if not all, states parties take the opposite position and interpret the Convention to 
permit substituted decision-making under certain circumstances, including at the very least in 
situations where decision-making ability is lacking and voluntary support is insufficient to prevent 
actions that entail serious negative consequences for the person concerned.301  
In the end, the lawfulness of financial guardianship regimes hinges on discrimination analysis. Regimes 
that aim to target persons with disabilities only as well as regimes which cover a larger group of people 
but have a disparate impact on persons with disabilities meet the definition of discrimination.302 To 
comply with the CRPD such regimes must serve legitimate aims and be justified as objective and 
reasonable.303 This means that they must pursue aims that are compatible with the object, purpose 
and provisions of the CRPD, that they must contribute to their aims, and that the negative 
consequences brought about by them must be reasonable.304 This weeds out regimes that do not 
actually provide protection against the financial harms they are set up to prevent. It further 
disqualifies systems that are over-protective in the sense that they provide for substituted decision-
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making in situations where the same level of protection can be achieved by voluntary support. The 
development of support mechanisms to aid people in their decision-making has just begun and there 
are good reasons to be optimistic about the future. There is a growing body of literature 
demonstrating that personal support and assistive technology can prevent financial harm just as 
effectively as substituted decision-making in many situations.305 Having said that, it remains uncertain 
whether various forms of support and assistive devices can cater for the needs of the entire group of 
people who are today subjected to some form of substituted decision-making.306 The hard cases 
involve situations where persons want to make transactions that will impoverish them, or take risks 
that are likely to lead to such results. It also includes situations where the will of the person concerned 
cannot be ascertained, either because we fail to understand the person’s unique way of 
communication or because his or her preferences appear conflicting. The person may for example 
want to spend her income on other things than rent but continue to live in her apartment. If such 
conflicts cannot be resolved by communication, states parties could respect her wish to not pay rent 
or vest a third party with the power to disregard that preference and ensure that the landlord is 
reimbursed for the rental fee. The latter protects the person from losing her apartment but intrudes 
on her right to legal agency. The former alternative protects her status as a legal actor but includes a 
risk of homelessness. Which of these alternatives we prefer depends on the values and costs we attach 
to the interests at stake: the value of being in charge of one’s financial affairs and the cost of having 
one’s choices overridden versus the value of keeping one’s apartment and the cost/risk of losing it. 
The Convention offers no clear-cut answer to such matters.307  
To determine whether a particular domestic system is reasonable, we need to consider its effects.308 
Systems with negative effects for those concerned are unreasonable unless the harms in question are 
compensated by positive outcomes. There is compelling evidence that systems of guardianship have 
led to unfathomable human rights abuses.309 They have stripped persons with disabilities of their 
assets and transferred them to dishonest third parties. 310 And they have enabled paternalistic 
guardians to prevent members of this group from pursing their life projects. Having said that, not all 
forms of substituted decision-making are equally intrusive on individuals’ capacity to manage their 
affairs, nor do they have equally severe implications on other spheres of life. Many states parties 
provide for financial guardianship, which can be limited to certain types of decisions or specified parts 
of the individual’s assets (e.g. to selling real estate or spending a particular inheritance).311 Moreover, 
the quality of domestic services and of the safeguards in place to prevent abuses varies across 
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jurisdictions. The same can be said about people’s experiences of substituted decision-making.312 
Thus, the precise promise and perils of a particular system depends on “how much” it interferes with 
the individuals’ rights and on “how much” protection it offers when compared to other less restrictive 
ways to prevent financial harm. Preventive measures can take many forms and affect different actors. 
States could, for example, prohibit certain forms of marketing that encourages overspending, provide 
for a system of so-called advanced directives (where individuals set limits for their own spending), or 
set up systems that allow individuals to cancel harmful contracts under certain conditions.  
To guide reasoning about reasonableness, it can be instructive to ask: “would it be reasonable to 
subject persons without disabilities in similar situations to the same restrictions of legal agency?” A 
state policy may seem reasonable when viewed in isolation. Drawing on the example provided above, 
it may seem reasonable to prevent persons with intellectual disabilities from spending their income 
in a way that jeopardises their place of residence. The great value we attach to having a place to live, 
and the negative effects associated with homelessness could undergird such a claim. It is, however, 
also possible to argue for the opposite, and say that it is more important to provide people with the 
opportunity to shape their lives why we should respect financial choices also in situations where such 
decisions have negative implications for the person concerned.313 Even if both positions were to be 
compatible with the CRPD, which would imply that states have discretion on this matter, it seems 
wrong to allow states to deny persons with disabilities the right to manage their financial affairs based 
on the first claim, and, at the same time, accept that states refrain from imposing similar restrictions 
on persons without disabilities because of the second claim. Presumably, the prohibition of 
discrimination requires states parties to work out a consistent ‘disability-neutral’ approach to financial 
risk-taking.314  
In addition, we need to be mindful of the specific harms that domestic practices meeting the definition 
of discrimination can cause to those concerned. This includes disrespect for human dignity, 
stereotyping, prejudice, and social disadvantage.315 The treaty text of the CRPD confirms the relevance 
of these factors. The preamble to the treaty explains that disability-based discrimination disrespects 
“the inherent dignity and worth of the human person” and affirms states parties’ belief that the treaty, 
which has equality and non-discrimination as its core value, will “make a significant contribution to 
redressing the profound social disadvantage” experienced by persons with disabilities.316 Just like the 
CERD and the CEDAW, the CRPD includes specific obligations for states parties by which to combat 
public prejudice and discrimination from private actors.317 The degree to which a particular regime 
interfere with the dignity of those concerned and contribute to the spread of public prejudice and 
stereotypic beliefs of persons with disabilities depends on its legal design as well as on other factors. 
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Domestic practices that target persons with disabilities, in particular, reinforce stereotypical images 
of persons with disabilities as being unable to take on such tasks. Such regimes arguably interfere 
more with the dignity of members of this group than do regimes that are addressed towards a larger 
class of people who, under certain circumstances, are in need of protection against financial harms. 
To determine the reasonableness of a specific regime, all relevant negative effects must be balanced 
against the positive outcomes of that regime. 
 
Equal access to bank loans, mortgages and financial credit 
 
The credit market is another area where persons with disabilities encounter various barriers. Physical 
barriers obstructing access to bank offices, cash machines and Internet banking are covered by article 
9 CRPD.318 Article 12(5) focuses on access to bank loans and other forms of credit, including small loans 
(microloans) to impoverished borrowers who lack access to other forms of credit.319 Empirical 
research has identified several factors that can obstruct equal access to loans. The credit market is a 
complex market and it can be difficult to access information about the different credit options 
available and to evaluate them. A study from Australia suggests that persons with intellectual 
disabilities fare particularly poorly and – many times – feel that they have little choice but to enter 
into a contract they do not understand.320 Other studies illustrate the problems encountered by 
persons with visual impairments.321 States parties to the CRPD must address such problems by 
requiring banks to adjust their services to the extent that is reasonable.322 For example, banks need to 
provide information about their services in Braille, easy-to-read and other accessible formats and offer 
personal service to customers who needs such services. Moreover, studies indicate that credit 
applications from persons with disabilities are at times rejected without individual assessments by 
financial staff viewing persons with disabilities as economically non-productive and vulnerable to 
financial exploitation.323 Women with disabilities are particularly exposed in this respect.324 Such 
practices will often qualify as discrimination and states parties must take appropriate action to 
eliminate such misconducts.325 
A more complex challenge to achieve equal access to financial credit relates to the fact that certain 
impairments raise the risk for reckless spending and accumulating debt. Banks (and other creditors) 
recognize this risk and either reject loan applications from persons with certain disabilities or adjust 
the terms of the loans accordingly. In discussing the US context, Guzelian et al have outlined a number 
of ways to mitigate this problem. Financial guardianship is one option. Advance directives and surety 
(i.e. a public or private actor who commits to cover the debt in case the borrower fails to repay the 
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debt) are yet other possible alternatives.326 Each of these alternatives has implications on the 
individual’s possibilities to manage her financial affairs and they generate different levels of financial 
security for the creditor. As discussed above, guardianship severely restricts the individual’s 
possibilities to decide on financial matters, and even if the presence of a guardian may convince a 
bank to accept a loan application, the guardian remains in charge of the new funds and decides how 
the funds or assets may be spent. In so-called advance directives, the individual creates self-imposed 
limits on her spending with the aim of increasing her ability to repay the credit on time.327 An 
advantage with such a system is that the individual remains in control over her financial affairs. How 
much security advance directives generate for creditors depends on the domestic context. What 
happens if the individual departs from the directive and stops repaying the creditor? Suretyship means 
that a third party acts as a guarantor. Such arrangements can theoretically be designed to intrude very 
little on the borrower’s legal agency and, at the same time, satisfy the creditors’ interest of financial 
security. In practice, it will, however, be difficult for many persons with disabilities to find sureties 
willing to pledge for them under such circumstances. Whether any of the alternatives discussed here 
are sufficient to ensure equal access in a domestic context can only be determined by discrimination 
analysis as outlined in the previous section.  
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